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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS  
__________________ 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
DAVID BRUCE BUTTARS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
__________________ 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
A jury found Buttars guilty of four counts of securities fraud and one count of 
pattern of unlawful activity. The State secured these convictions through a combination 
of inadmissible bank record evidence, erroneous instructions, and improper expert 
testimony and prosecutorial argument. Individually and cumulatively, these errors 
undermine confidence in the fairness of Buttars’s trial. 
ISSUES, STANDARDS, PRESERVATION 
Issue I: Whether the court erred in admitting the bank record evidence. 
Specifically:  
A. Whether the court erred in denying Buttars’s motion to suppress 
unconstitutionally seized bank records. 
Standard/Preservation: This Court applies a clearly-erroneous standard to 
factual findings and reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. State v. 
Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶10. This issue is preserved. R.766-48, 886-907, 962-1055 
(briefing); R.3061-96 (argument); R.1085-90, 3098-3104 (rulings). 
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B. Whether the court erred in admitting the bank records under the residual 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
Standard/Preservation: “Whether evidence is admissible is a question of law, 
which [this Court] review[s] for correctness, incorporating a ‘clearly erroneous’ 
standard… for []factual determinations.’” Radman v. Flanders, 2007 UT App 351,¶4. 
This issue is preserved. R.734-36, 862-85, 910-61,1058-1063 (briefing); R.3104-39 
(argument); R.1148-1155, 3180-3212 (ruling).  
C. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the bank record 
summaries (Exhibits 26-32) as inadmissible under rule 1006 where they did 
not prove the content of the underlying bank records. 
Standard/Preservation: This issue is unpreserved. But it can be reached under 
the doctrine of ineffective assistance, which is an exception to the preservation rule 
and is reviewed as a matter of law. State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114,¶28. 
Issue II: Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing incorrect 
instructions on the definition of “willfulness.” 
Standard/Preservation: This Court will review jury instructions for correctness. 
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This issue is unpreserved and 
may be reviewed for ineffective assistance or exceptional circumstances. Kozlov, 2012 
UT App 114,¶28. 
Issue III: Whether this Court should reverse where expert testimony, prosecutorial 
argument, and a jury instruction misstated the law surrounding a defendant’s disclosure 
obligations under the securities fraud statute.  
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Standard/Preservation: “‘Questions of law are reviewed for correctness.’” State v. 
Goodrich, 2016 UT App 72,¶6. This issue is partially preserved. R.4124-26. To the 
extent the issue is unpreserved, it may be reviewed for ineffective assistance. Kozlov, 
2012 UT App 114,¶28; supra §III.B. 
Issue IV: Whether this Court should grant Buttars a new trial on all counts where 
the State’s experts gave testimony that violated rules 702, 704, and 403. 
Standard/Preservation: The Court reviews the admission of expert testimony for an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This issue is 
preserved. R.5210-29 (Curtis’s testimony); R.4827-38, 5225-26 (Lloyd’s testimony). 
Issue V: Whether cumulative error requires reversal. 
Standard/Preservation: A claim of cumulative error “requires [this Court] to apply 
the standard of review applicable to each underlying claim.” Radman, 2007 UT App 
351,¶4. Preservation is inapplicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS  
The charges stemmed from Buttars’s involvement in the startup companies, 
Ellipse Technology and MOVIEblitz North America. R.1-58, 534-39. Buttars became a 
suspect after the State’s investigator, Agent Nesbit, spent several years pursuing Buttars’s 
ex-girlfriend’s allegation that Buttars stalked her. R.650, 685-87, 689-90; see 570-711. 
Buttars successfully defended those allegations both civilly and criminally, obtaining an 
acquittal in the criminal case and prevailing and obtaining attorney fees in the civil 
matter. R.679, 614-41. But the ex-girlfriend, an investor in Ellipse, further complained 
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that Ellipse was a “lousy company.” R.631. Nesbit investigated Ellipse and MOVIEblitz 
and subpoenaed Buttars’s bank records.  
As a result of Nesbit’s investigation, Buttars was charged with four counts of 
securities fraud, second/third degree felonies; four counts of theft, second/third degree 
felonies; and one count of pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony. R.1-58, 
394-98, 534-39. Specifically, the State alleged that in 2009-2010, Buttars—with his co-
defendant Mark LaCount—misused investor funds and omitted and misrepresented 
material facts to investors, in violation of Utah Code §§61-1-1(2)-(3), 61-1-21. Id. The 
magistrate expressed “misgivings” about the State’s case, but bound it over. R.2794-95. 
After extensive litigation regarding the admissibility of Buttars’s bank records, the court 
ruled the records admissible. Infra pp.13-16.  
The case proceeded to a jury trial held on September 26-28, 2016. R.1363-75. The 
court gave two instructions, discussed in detail below (infra pp.51-52, 62), that Buttars 
now challenges on appeal. Addendum B (instructions). The jury acquitted on all four 
counts of theft, but found Buttars guilty on the pattern count and on all four counts of 
securities fraud. R.1432-33. The court sentenced Buttars to three 0-5 year prison terms 
(securities fraud counts) and two 1-15 year prison terms (securities fraud and pattern 
counts), running them all concurrently. R.1491-93; Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, 





Ellipse Technology was a startup company incorporated in 2005. R.4856; 
St.Ex.36. Ellipse sought to create movie kiosks where customers could load movies onto 
personalized flash drives. R.4856; St.Ex.1. Then, customers could take the flash drives 
home and watch the movies on their home devices. Id. Buttars, a trained engineer, was 
the “brains” behind the project. R.4856, 4886, 4944, 4972, 5032. 
Buttars ultimately became the CEO of Ellipse and another man, Vince Romney, 
became the president. R.4895, 4910, 4954, 5028-29. The two owned the company 
“50/50,” R.4940, though several others also became involved, including Steven 
Gerritsen. R.4907-10, 4953-54, 5025, 5030. For some time, Romney and Buttars worked 
for the company full time and drew a salary. R.4863, 4889-91, 4947.  
Ellipse was headquartered at Buttars’s Park City home—which was equipped with 
a basement conference room, servers, and a phone system. R.4891-93, 4958. Weekly 
meetings were held there, R.4891, 4911-12, 4944, 4958, 5028, and it was common for 
Ellipse-related travelers to stay at Buttars’s home when visiting on business. R.4892. 
Ellipse also obtained investors, went on business trips, and sought the advice of attorneys. 
R.4888, 4960, 5027-28, 5065-66; St.Ex.32. By 2009, Ellipse was about 75-85 percent on 
the way toward having a working prototype. R.4930-31.  
At some point, Ellipse’s attorneys advised Buttars and the company to stop raising 
money from friends and family and to target institutional investors. R.4864-65, 4912-13, 
5039-40. The State presented evidence that Ellipse received several offers from 
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institutional investors in 2007-2008, but Buttars rejected them. R.4865-66, 4919-22, 
5034-36.  This upset some of those involved in the company. R.4919-21. 
In the latter part of 2008, Buttars involved LaCount in Ellipse. R.4940, 5030, 
5040-41. LaCount traveled to Europe to promote the company in Switzerland, R.4922-
30, 4868-69, 4890, but when he returned, the company was in need of money. R.4869-70. 
And at a certain point, Romney allegedly “found out… that there had been fundraising 
[through friends and family] at a micro level again.” Id. One witness testified that during 
this timeframe Buttars fired him for failing to secure fundraising and stated “how do you 
expect me to support two families on what you've brought in?” R.4965-68. The State also 
presented testimony that Ellipse money went toward paying LaCount’s mortgage, 
R.4924-30, 4937-41, and another witness testified that he suspected Buttars was misusing 
funds. R.5047-49. 
Romney testified that in early 2009, in response to allegations of Buttars’s misuse 
of funds and improper fundraising, he and several others retained independent counsel. 
R.4870-71, 4874-4877, 4881-82, 5047-49. After some correspondence, Buttars allegedly 
resigned as CEO but would not relinquish his shares. R.5069-70. Moreover, Romney 
testified that both he and Buttars’s names were on the pending patents needed to advance 
the technology. R.4901-02, 5484-87. According to the State’s witnesses, these were “road 
blocks” that impeded Ellipse from proceeding without Buttars. R.5069-70. 
Buttars and LaCount went forward with the technology under the company name, 
MOVIEblitz. St.Ex.37. The existence of a licensing agreement between Ellipse and 
MOVIEblitz sounded “vaguely familiar” to the State’s investigator. R.5534-35. 
7 
 
Moreover, the State did not pull the applicable patents or introduce the patents into 
evidence. R.5537, 5486. 
The Investors.  
Of 50-70 investors, only 4 investors—Mother, Neighbor, Neighbor's boyfriend, 
and Neighbor's ex-husband—testified. R.5073-5167, 5504-06, 5520-21, 5557-58.  
Mother’s investment. Mother heard about Ellipse and MOVIEblitz from her son, 
Gerritsen, R.5025. Mother testified that she spoke with Buttars on “a couple occasions is 
all” (R.5074); she thought Gerritsen provided most of the information about the 
investment. R.5081. On one occasion, Mother “th[ought] [she] might’ve had a phone 
call” with Buttars in which Buttars said that her investment would be “used for the 
technology and to bring it to market… more quickly.” R.5078-79; see also R.5041-42, 
5067 (Gerritsen testifying to a phone call in which Buttars communicated to Mother that 
the company was “close to getting a product developed” and was raising money to 
develop prototypes). Mother had previously indicated that she spoke with Buttars only 
once at a concert. R.5532-33.  
On March 10-11, 2009, Mother invested $5000. R.5028; St.Exs.3, 26.1 She signed 
a subscription agreement for stock in Ellipse, acknowledging, among other things, that 
“acquisition of the [s]ubscribed [s]hares represent[s] a speculative investment involving a 
                                                             
1 Mother previously invested $10,000 in 2007. R.5028; St.Exs.3, 26. 
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high degree of risk.” R.5077-78, 5081-82; St.Ex.4.2 Mother said she never received 
anything evidencing stock ownership.  R.5078-79.    
The investments of LaCount’s neighbors/friends. Neighbor learned about 
MOVIEblitz after she was approached by LaCount—a friend who lived in her 
neighborhood. R.5089, 5105, 5123. Neighbor hosted approximately three meetings at her 
home to discuss MOVIEblitz and invited her boyfriend and ex-husband to attend. 
R.5105, 5112-13, 5118-27, 514. 
The first two meetings took place around May 2009 with LaCount, Neighbor, and 
Neighbor’s boyfriend present. R.5090-91, 5118-19, 5136, 5141-42. Neighbor and her 
boyfriend testified inconsistently as to whether Buttars was present at this first meeting, 
id., but agreed that at one of the meetings, Buttars gave a “presentation about what 
MOVIEblitz was.” R.5090-96, 5106,5112, 5118-20, 5130-31, 5136, 5145; St.Exs.8,13. 
According to Neighbor, Buttars explained the “technical aspects,” including showing 
them the “patents he had gotten” and describing the technology. R.5090-91, 5102,5106, 
5112, 5136. They were also presented with the MOVIEblitz business plan. R.5095-96; 
St.Ex.8. This plan included a sample subscription agreement that discussed the risks of 
investing as well as pro forma financials that contemplated the payment of salaries. 
St.Ex.8. 
                                                             
2 “Subscription agreements… contain the obligations of the parties with respect to 
the [securities] transaction and define what's being sold, and what's being paid, in 
exchange for that particular security.” R.5467-68, 5490. 
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At one of the meetings, “it was stated” that investment money would be used to 
incorporate in Nevada and develop a media key and a kiosk. R.5098-99, 5112,5133.3 
Moreover, Neighbor's boyfriend previously indicated in a State-provided questionnaire 
that it was “LaCount [who] told us how great the company was, and our money... was 
going to be used to register the company in Nevada.” R.5139. Neighbor's boyfriend 
mentioned Buttars little in the questionnaire “because [LaCount] was initially the one that 
did all this stuff.” R.5141-42. 
Neighbor hosted a third meeting in late 2009-early 2010 at which Buttars allegedly 
gave a similar presentation. R.5113, 5124-25, 5148. Neighbor, Neighbor’s boyfriend, 
Neighbor’s ex-husband, LaCount, and Buttars were present. Id. Neighbor’s ex-husband 
recalled Buttars saying that the technology was “unique,” but did not “recall a whole lot 
about the conversation.” R.5148-49.  
In late May 2009, Neighbor and her boyfriend each invested $2000 in exchange 
for stock in MOVIEblitz. R.5092-94, 5107, 5120-21. St.Ex.5-6, 9-10. They testified that 
upon Buttars’sand LaCount's request, they wrote their checks out to Buttars. R.5091-93, 
5120-21; see also R5139. Portions of their investments were ultimately deposited in 
Buttars’s personal account. St.Ex.26. After investing, both Neighbor and her boyfriend 
signed subscription agreements similar to the one signed by Mother. R.5995, 5099-5102, 
5107, 5112,5129-30; St.Ex.7,14; Def.Ex.28. 
                                                             
3 The State stipulated that MOVIEblitz was indeed registered in Nevada. R.5522.  
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On January 11, 2010, Neighbor’s boyfriend invested another $7000 in 
MOVIEblitz in exchange for 70,000 shares. R.5126-27; St.Exs.11-12, 15. Neighbor’s ex-
husband also invested, writing checks for $10,000 on February 1-2, 2010, in exchange for 
a stock. R.5149-51; St.Exs.16-19. After investing, Neighbor’s ex-husband signed a 
subscription agreement. R.5153; St.Ex.20. Neighbor’s ex-husband understood it as an 
“investment opportunity to get[] Movie Blitz off the ground” and understood that his 
investment would be used to develop a media key and kiosks. R.5148-49, 5154-55. 
According to the investors, Buttars did not mention: that there were risks involved 
in the business; that MOVIEblitz was undercapitalized and had outstanding debt; that a 
failed company called Ellipse predated MOVIEblitz and was dedicated to developing a 
similar product; that other individuals had a claim to the intellectual property; and that 
their investments would be for another purpose, like paying Buttars’s personal expenses. 
R.5080, 5096-99, 5111-13, 5119-20, 5133-34, 5148-49, 5154-56, 5162.  
The investors described the communications surrounding Ellipse and MOVIEblitz 
using descriptors such as “positive,” “no risks involved,” and painting a “pretty picture” 
about a product that “nothing… [could] compete with.” R.5067, 5080, 5090-91, 5096-97, 
5112, 5118-20, 5124-25, 5130-31, 5145, 5156, 5161. Moreover, the investors testified 
that they never received returns on their investments. R.5078-79, 5101-03, 5110, 5133, 
5152, 5155. The summaries reveal a payment to Neighbor’s ex-husband for $6,500. 
St.Ex.26 at 12. 
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Bank record summaries and Curtis’s expert testimony 
To try to demonstrate that Buttars misused investor money for personal expenses, 
the State admitted “summaries” of Buttars personal and business bank records through its 
forensic accounting expert, John Curtis. R.5168-69, 5175-5209; St.Exs.26-32. The 
summaries, marked as Exhibits 26-32, are attached at Addendum C. Moreover, the record 
suggests that all exhibits, including Exhibits 26-32, were available to jurors during 
deliberations. R.5668. The underlying bank records themselves were not admitted. 
Exhibits 26-32 purport to document the flow of incoming and outgoing funds 
relating to the accounts of Ellipse, MOVIEblitz, and Buttars’s personal account. 
St.Exs.26-32. The summaries do not account for nearly $80,000 worth of checks that 
Buttars gave to Ellipse from his personal account from September, 2007-January, 2009. 
Def.Exs.11-22.  
The summaries also label certain transactions as “investor money” and opine that 
funds were “comingled.” Id. In addition, Exhibits 26-31 categorize certain payments as 
“questionable,” and “potentially legitimate.” St.Exs.26-31. Among the “questionable” 
payments were payments to Buttars, LaCount, “Steve Groves (private investigator),” 
“Reynalda Juarez (Housekeeping),” “Kay Burmingham (Lawyer and [Buttars’s] Ex-
wife),” and “BAC Home Loans,” as well as payments to restaurants, utility companies, 
grocery stores, and a talent management group. Id. The State attempted to support its 
conclusion that these payments were questionable by eliciting testimony that Ellipse had 
no need to pay for a talent agency, a private investigator, or the housekeeper (who 
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testified that she cleaned Buttars’s whole home). R.4867-88, 4917-18, 4961-62, 5042-46, 
5456-57.  
On direct, Curtis went through payments and observations that raised “red flags” 
and “st[oo]d out.” E.g., R.5199, 5204, 5207, 5180-82,5185, 5195, 5199-5200. Moreover, 
over Buttars’s objections, Curtis identified various characteristics of “fraud, deceit, or 
theft,” and opined that these characteristics were present in Buttars’s case. R.5210-29.4 
According to Curtis, documents relating to the foreclosure of Buttars’s home and his 
missed credit card payments further supported Curtis’s opinions; the documents 
demonstrated that Buttars’s was in “financial distress”—which, Curtis said, “would be a 
significant disclosure to investors.” R.5423-39; St.Exs.39-40 
On cross-examination, defense counsel went through the various transactions and 
payments in detail, eliciting evidence that many of the payments could be proper business 
expenses associated with bringing the product to market. R.5248-5268, 5295-5307,5313-
18; see, e.g., R.5521, 5295-96, Def.Exs.1,24. Curtis also acknowledged that a person can 
account for any misplaced payments in their end-of-the-year taxes. R.5233, 5306-07, 
5233, 5317-18. Even though the State procured Buttars’s tax documents, it did not 
present them at trial, and it did not provide them to Curtis. R.5307-08, 5521.  
Moreover, Curtis acknowledged that if Buttars paid himself a salary, payments 
from the business accounts to Buttars’s personal account would not be “questionable,” 
provided the salary “was disclosed and authorized.” R.5258-59, 5315-18. The State tried 
                                                             
4 Curtis’s testimony is set forth in detail at pp.69-70 and Addendum D. 
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to rebut the defense’s suggestion that Buttars was paying himself a salary by introducing 
a document in which Buttars stated that he was unemployed during the relevant time 
frame. See St.Ex.40—attachment B. Curtis never spoke with LaCount and thus, could not 
testify to the purpose behind the payments to him. R.5315-16. 
Lloyd’s expert testimony 
Brian Lloyd, the State’s securities expert, made various statements about the 
disclosure obligations of securities salespeople, R.4826-38, 4843-44, 5468-69; and—over 
Buttars’s objections—the meaning of material. R.4827-39; Addendum E (Lloyd’s 
testimony). In closing, the prosecutor also made statements about the legal obligations of 
disclosure. Addendum F (prosecutor’s argument). The statements of Lloyd and the 
prosecutor are discussed in detail below. Infra p.61. 
Moreover, Lloyd testified that “[b]ased on [his] experience in the securities 
industry” it would be “important” to disclose whether patents are encumbered and 
whether a predecessor company existed. R.5471-5475. 
Bank Records 
The State applied to obtain Buttars’s bank records through the Subpoena Powers 
Act (“SPA”). R.785-801, 805-42, 859, 1085-86; Def.Ex. A-L (9/14/2015 Hr’g); St.Ex.8 
(9/14/2015 Hr’g). 
Prior to issuing the subpoenas, the State filed a statement of good cause, R.786-92, 
806-12, 825-33; Def.Ex.A-B, G-H, and a magistrate “[a]pprov[ed]… an [i]nvestigation” 
based on “good cause appearing.” R.793-95, 814-16, 822-24. Def.Ex.C, I, K. The 
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magistrate then reviewed each subpoena to “determin[e] whether the subpoenas were 
reasonably related to the [court-authorized] criminal investigation.” R.1087. 
The State then served the subpoenas on Buttars’s banks, JP Morgan Chase and 
Frontier Bank.5 R.797-99, 818-20, 834-36, 839-42, 1086-87; Def.Ex.D, J. The subpoenas 
contained references to an irrelevant provision of the Utah Code and ordered the 
recipients “not to disclose to any person the existence or service of the subpoena.” See id. 
The State did not obtain a secrecy order, as required by Utah Code §77-22-2, to keep the 
investigation or the subpoenaed materials secret. R.1087. Rather, the inclusion of this 
language “was an error.” R.1086. The State never notified Buttars that it had issued 
subpoenas to his banks. R.1087, 2972-73.  
Producing the Frontier records took some time because Frontier had closed its 
Utah branch and “most everything [wa]s jumbled in storage.” R.2963-64; Def.Ex O 
(9/14/2015 Hr’g). Frontier ultimately produced the records in 3-4 productions, but only 
two productions were accompanied with custodian certificates. R.1150, 3197-98. It was 
unclear which certificate went to which production. R.3197-98. 
Curtis compiled summaries of the records, St.Exs.26-32, and the State moved for a 
pretrial ruling on the summaries’ admissibility. R.734-36, 862-85. It argued that the 
underlying bank records were admissible under rules 803(6) and 703. R.734-36, 862-85. 
                                                             
5 In 2012, Frontier Bank was acquired by a successor bank and moved its entire 




The State further argued that the summaries were admissible under rule 1006 because 
they distilled voluminous records. See id. 
The defense objected to the admission of the bank records/summaries on two 
primary grounds. First, Buttars argued that the State obtained the bank records in secrecy 
and without notice, in violation of his rights under the Utah Constitution and Fourth 
Amendment. R.766-87, 962-1055, 3067-86, 3093-3096. Second, Buttars argued that the 
bank records/summaries were inadmissible because the missing custodian certificates 
precluded admissibility under rule 803(6)’s business records exception to the hearsay 
rule. R.910-61.  
The court held an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of the bank 
records/summaries. R.855-56, 2933-3048. There, the State introduced the summaries, but 
did not introduce the underlying bank records. Curtis and Nesbit testified that the records 
appeared to be complete and “were what they purported to be.” R.1150, 1217-18. The 
State, however, did not call a records custodian.  
After briefing and argument on the admissibility of the bank records/summaries, 
the court issued two rulings. See R.766-87 886-907, 962-1055 (suppression briefing); 
R.3061-96 (suppression argument); R.1085-90, 3098-3104 (suppression ruling); R.734-
36, 862-85, 910-61, 1058-1063 (initial hearsay briefing); R.3104-39 (initial hearsay 
argument); R.1148-1155, 3180-3212 (initial hearsay ruling). 
First, the court denied Buttars’s motion to suppress the bank records. R.1085-90, 
3098-3104; Addendum G (order). It determined (1) that the State is not required to notify 
defendants when it issues subpoenas for their bank records; (2) that the erroneous secrecy 
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language did not render the subpoenas unlawful; (3) and in any event, the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule applied. R.1085-90. 
Second, the court denied, without prejudice, the State’s motion to admit the bank 
records. R.1148-1155, 3180-3212; Addendum H (order). It reasoned that “while… the 
State met its burden of proving [] authenticity,” the missing custodian certificates 
precluded the State from meeting its burden under rule 803(6). R.1148-1155. Thus, the 
records were inadmissible hearsay. Id. The court also determined that Curtis could rely 
on the bank records to form an opinion under rule 703. Id. But it did not rule on the 
admissibility of the records under rule 703 because the parties did not brief the second 
prong of rule 703—whether the records’ “‘probative value in helping the jury evaluate 
[Curtis’s] opinion substantially outweigh[ed] their prejudicial effect.’” R.1153-54. 
The State then filed a supplemental brief, arguing that the bank records were 
admissible under rule 703’s second prong. R.1137-1145; 1177-1185. Alternatively, the 
State asserted that the evidence was admissible under rule 807’s residual exception to the 
hearsay rule. Id.  
After considering the additional briefing and argument, the court ruled that the 
bank records were admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule. R.1137-
45, 1158-1174, 1177-85 (briefing); R.3216-42 (argument); R.1216-23, 3274-93 (ruling); 
Addendum H (applicable order). The court “d[id] not address whether the records or 
summaries [we]re also admissible under Rule 703” because they were “admissible for 
their substance under Rule 807.” R.1219. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. This Court should grant Buttars a new trial on all counts because the trial court 
erred in admitting prejudicial bank record evidence. The bank record evidence was 
inadmissible for three reasons. 
First, the court should have suppressed the bank record evidence because the State 
unconstitutionally obtained the evidence using secret and unlawful subpoenas. 
Second, the summaries (Exhibits 26-32) were inadmissible under rule 1006 because the 
underlying bank records constituted inadmissible hearsay that did not qualify under the 
residual exception. And third, the summaries were inadmissible under rule 1006 because 
they contained State-drawn conclusions and extra-bank record information; counsel 
performed ineffectively by failing to object to the summaries on the grounds that they did 
not prove the content of the underlying bank records. 
II. Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing an incorrect instruction 
defining “willfulness.” The instruction incorrectly incorporated conscious 
avoidance/willful blindness principles and misarticulated the conduct that must be the 
object of a defendant’s willfulness. Allowing this instruction constituted deficient 
performance that prejudiced Buttars. Alternatively, this Court may reverse under the 
exceptional circumstances doctrine. 
III. This Court should reverse because the State presented prejudicial expert 
testimony, argument, and jury instructions that misstated the law and expanded the 
conduct criminalized by the securities fraud statute. Specifically, the misstatements 
incorrectly suggested that the law imposed an affirmative duty to disclose material 
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information—a violation of which rendered a defendant’s genuine beliefs in his 
statements “not[] a defense.” To the extent counsel failed to adequately preserve the 
issue, that failure constituted ineffective assistance. 
IV. The trial court erred by admitting expert testimony that violated rules 702, 
704, and 403. The expert testimony of Curtis and/or Lloyd did not help the trier of fact, 
was unduly prejudicial, and improperly stated legal conclusions. This Court should 
reverse because the improper testimony undermines confidence in the verdict. 
V. Cumulative error requires reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
I.  The bank record evidence was inadmissible. 
The bank record evidence was inadmissible because the State obtained Buttars’s 
bank records in violation of his rights under Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution and 
the Fourth Amendment. Infra §I.A. Even if the records were lawfully obtained, the 
summaries were inadmissible because the underlying bank records were hearsay. Infra 
§I.B. Alternatively, counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the summaries on the 
grounds that they did not accurately reflect the contents of the underlying bank records. 
Infra §I.C. 
A. The court erred in failing to suppress the bank record evidence. 
The State violated Buttars’s rights under Article I, §14 and Fourth Amendment by 
using secret SPA subpoenas to obtain his protected bank records.  This Court should 
reverse because the State unlawfully seized Buttars’s bank records, infra §I.A.1; the good 
19 
 
faith exception does not apply, infra §I.A.2; and the bank record evidence prejudiced 
Buttars. Infra §I.A.3. 
1. The State unlawfully seized Buttars’ bank records. 
Article I, §14 and the Fourth Amendment grant defendants the right “to be secure 
in their… papers... against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  Utah Const. art. I, §14; 
U.S.Const. amend. IV; Addendum I (provisions). In State v. Thompson, our supreme 
court interpreted Article I, §14 to grant defendants a privacy interest in their bank records 
and a right to be free from seizures of those records by way of unlawful subpoenas. 810 
P.2d 415, 416-18 (Utah 1991). 
In Thompson, the State began an investigation of the defendants' financial 
activities and issued subpoenas duces tecum to banks for the defendants' financial 
records. Id. at 415-16. The defendants argued that the subpoenas were illegal. Id. at 416. 
They also sought suppression of the records  because attaining the evidence through 
invalid subpoenas constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. See id. 
The Utah Supreme Court held “that under [A]rticle I, [§]14 of the Utah 
Constitution, [the] defendants... had a right to be secure against unreasonable searches 
and seizures of their bank [records] ‘and all papers which they supplied to the bank... 
upon the reasonable assumption that the information would remain confidential.’” Id. at 
418. The court determined that the defendants had a “right to privacy” in the content of 
their bank records. Id. It then acknowledged that the subpoenas were unlawful/invalid. Id. 
at 420. The supreme court determined that the search and seizure of the bank records by 
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way of unlawful subpoenas was therefore unreasonable under Article I, §14. Id. at 418-
19.  
The question in this case, then, is what makes a subpoena lawful? Id. And 
relatedly, were the SPA subpoenas lawful here? Id. 
*** 
The SPA gives the State broad powers to subpoena information and seemingly 
applies to privileged and constitutionally-protected information—including bank records. 
Utah Code §77-22-2; Addendum I. When the act faces constitutional problems, our 
supreme court has been willing read in procedural protections so as to save it from 
unconstitutionality. See In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988) 
(superseded by statute). 
The SPA provides that “upon application and approval of the district court and for 
good cause shown, [the prosecutor may] conduct a criminal investigation.” Utah Code 
§77-22-2(2)(a). Upon such a showing, the prosecutor may then “subpoena witnesses” and 
“require the production of… documents.” Id. §77-22-2(3)(a). The prosecutor, however, 
“shall…  apply to the district court for each subpoena[]” and “show that the requested 
information is reasonably related to the criminal investigation authorized by the court.”  
Id. §77-22-2(3)(b). 
Moreover, “[u]pon an additional showing by a prosecutor that publicly releasing 
information… may ‘pose a threat of harm to a person or otherwise impede the 
investigation,’ a court may order, among other things, that the ‘occurrence of... the 
subpoenaing of evidence... be kept secret.’” Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶19. 
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 The SPA—and of course the state and federal constitutions—dictate the 
lawfulness of subpoenas issued under the act. See Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633. 
Moreover, the Thompson court looked to Criminal Investigation for the “the test of 
whether a subpoena issued under the [SPA] is lawful.” Thompson, 810 P.2d at 418. 
Buttars recognizes, as the trial court did, that Criminal Investigation and 
Thompson concerned subpoenas that were issued under a previous version of the SPA—a 
version of the act that did not require the prosecution to apply to a court for individual 
subpoenas. R.1088-89. The Criminal Investigation court, however, did not find the SPA’s 
lack of judicial oversight to be fatal. Instead, the court was concerned with, among other 
things, the subpoenaed party’s ability to mount a meaningful pre-compliance challenge to 
the subpoena. 754 P.2d at 656, 658-59. 
 The Criminal Investigation court stated, that “a subpoenaed person must have a 
meaningful opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of a subpoena.” Id. at 656. Moreover, 
while our supreme court determined that the SPA was facially constitutional, it held that 
the SPA was unconstitutionally applied where the “secrecy provisions… were applied too 
broadly.” Id. at 659. And to the extent that the broadly-applied secrecy provisions 
“impeded the challenge of subpoenas…, it operated to deny rights against unreasonable 
search and seizure.” Id. More recently, our supreme court relied on Criminal 
Investigation to similarly hold that “[t]he Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the 
subpoenaed party is allowed ‘to question the reasonableness of the subpoena, before 
suffering any penalties for refusing to comply with it, by raising objections… in [the] 
district court.’” Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14,¶31.  
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The pre-compliance opportunity to challenge the subpoena would be of little value 
without notice. State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72,¶32. Indeed, “‘[t]he fundamental requisite 
of due process… is the opportunity to be heard, a right which has little reality or worth 
unless one is informed that the matter is pending and one can choose for himself whether 
to contest.’” Id. 
 Due process and other constitutional concerns dictate that in certain situations, a 
defendant is entitled to notice of the issuance of a subpoena. Yount, 2008 UT App 102. 
This Court recognized these principles in Yount, which held that the “the State's failure to 
notify Defendant of the subpoenas for his medical records was a violation of his rights 
and rendered the subpoenas invalid.” Id.¶16. 
 In Yount, this Court explained “that due process concerns arise where no notice is 
given to the party whose confidential or privileged records are subpoenaed.” Id.¶13. 
“When a party's confidential records are reviewed before he even knows they are 
subpoenaed, he cannot choose to protect them.” Id. (cleaned up). Thus, “‘[t]he only way 
to prevent this is to ensure that the party receives notification that a subpoena has been 
issued.’” Id. And where the Yount defendant did not receive notice, he “was denied an 
opportunity to assert his potential privilege or to otherwise pursue procedural safeguards 
in court to avoid unnecessary disclosure.” Id.¶16. 
Here, the trial court was wrong to conclude that “[t]he State is [n]ot [r]equired to 
[g]ive [n]otice to a [s]uspect in a [c]riminal [i]nvestigation [w]hen the State [i]ssues 
[s]ubpoenas to [b]anks for a [s]uspect’s [b]ank [r]ecords.” R.1088. While the SPA 
contains no express notice requirement, the act does not override basic constitutional 
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requirements. Case law suggests that to be lawful and constitutional, interested parties 
must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to object to subpoenas. Criminal 
Investigation, 754 P.2d at 656, 658-59; Burns, 2006 UT 14,¶31; Yount, 2008 UT App 
102,¶¶13-16.  Moreover, notice is critical in providing a defendant a pre-compliance 
opportunity to object. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72,¶32; Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶¶13-16. 
And where protected/privileged documents are the subject of the subpoena, notice is 
necessary to avoid due process and other constitutional problems. Yount, 2008 UT App 
102,¶¶13-16. 
The State in this case used a subpoena to obtain Buttars’s protected bank records. 
Like the privileged medical records in Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶¶13-16, Buttars’s bank 
records were constitutionally protected under Article I, §14. Thompson, 810 P.2d at 416-
18. Thus, as in Yount, Buttars was entitled to notice to allow him to object to the 
subpoena and “pursue procedural safeguards in court to avoid unnecessary disclosure.” 
Id.¶16. Without notice, the subpoenas were unlawful. Id. 
The erroneously included secrecy provision further worked to deprive Buttars of 
notice and the opportunity to object. R.797-99, 818-20, 834-36, 839-42, 1086-87; 
Def.Ex.D, J. The secrecy provisions directed the banks “not to disclose to any person the 
existence or service of the subpoena.” Id. These secrecy provisions were indisputably 
included in “error.” R.1086. 
In rejecting the import of the secrecy provision, the trial court reasoned that the 
State had otherwise “met all the requirements of obtaining a lawful subpoena” and that 
the erroneous grant of a secrecy order “is not a basis for attacking” the subpoena’s 
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validity. R.1088-89. But when the erroneous inclusion of a secrecy order serves to 
preclude a defendant from challenging a subpoena for constitutionally-protected 
documents, the subpoena is invalid. Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 656, 658-59; 
Burns, 2006 UT 14,¶31; Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶¶13-16.  Indeed, as discussed, case 
law shows that interested parties must be afforded a pre-compliance opportunity to 
challenge subpoenas for protected documents. Id. 
Here, the erroneous secrecy provision further deprived Buttars of notice and a pre-
compliance opportunity to object. For instance, California law, which governed the 
conduct of the Frontier Bank records custodian, prohibits disclosure of bank records 
absent “serv[ice of] a copy of the subpoena… on  the customer” and the allowance of 10 
days for the customer to seek quashal of the subpoena.  Cal. Gov’t Code §§7470(a) & 
(a)(2); 7474(a) & (a)(1)-(3). Any notice that Buttars might have received from his bank 
was further precluded by the secrecy provision.  
 The court was also wrong to focus on whether Buttars “would have successfully 
moved to quash” the subpoenas. R.1088-90. Buttars was entitled to a pre-compliance 
opportunity to object regardless of whether he would ultimately succeed in quashing 
them. To draw a comparison, Utah courts have determined that even if communications 
may fall under a privilege exception, “‘the patient has the right to be notified of the 
potential disclosure of confidential [medical] records.’” Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶15. 
“This notification is required to provide the patient with an ‘opportunity to assert [the] 
privilege’ and to… ‘pursue the appropriate procedural safeguards in court to avoid 
unnecessary disclosure.’” Id.  
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Just as a defendant need not show that privilege will bar the release of medical 
records, Buttars did not need to prove that the release of his bank records would be barred 
and the State's subpoena would be quashed. What is important is that Buttars be given an 
opportunity to “‘pursue procedural safeguards in court to avoid unnecessary disclosure.’” 
Id.6   
 In short, to be lawful, Buttars needed notice and a meaningful pre-compliance 
opportunity to challenge the subpoenas. The subpoenas issued to Buttars’s banks lacked 
these necessary procedural protections and were therefore unlawful. The seizure of 
Buttars’s bank records pursuant to unlawful subpoenas constituted an unreasonable 
search that violated Buttars’s State and federal constitutional rights. Thompson, 810 P.2d 
at 418. 
2. The violation requires suppression. 
The bank record evidence must be excluded pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, 
Article I, §14, Thompson, and Yount.  In Thompson, our supreme court considered 
whether the unlawfully seized bank records should be suppressed. 810 P.2d at 419. At the 
outset, the court noted that “‘[e]xclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary 
consequence of police violations of [A]rticle I, [§]14.’” Id. “The supreme court accepted 
the defendants' analogy between a[n] officer's erroneous action in a warrantless search 
and an attorney's ‘unconstitutional application of the [SPA].’” Yount, 2008 UT App 
                                                             
6 For instance, Buttars could have contended that due to the protected status of the 
records, the State needed to make a higher showing than that required by the SPA, which 
only required that the bank records be “reasonably related to the criminal investigation” 
for which there was “good cause.”  Utah Code §77-22-2(3)(b). 
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102,¶15. “Based on the general rule and this analogy, the supreme court concluded that 
‘[a]ll bank records obtained as a result of illegal subpoenas must... be suppressed unless 
[the] good faith exception’” applied. Id. The good faith exception did not apply, however, 
because the “illegal subpoenas [were] issued… by the attorney general, who [wa]s 
chargeable for the illegality.”  Thompson, 810 P.2d at 419-20.  
 Relying on Thompson, this Court in Yount likewise suppressed “medical records[] 
obtained through subpoenas that were illegal due to the State's failure to notify Defendant 
of their issuance.” Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶24. Moreover, the Yount court determined 
that the good faith exception did not apply “because the trial court merely authorized the 
prosecutor to prepare” the subpoenas. Id.¶26 n.3. The court, however, “did not authorize 
the prosecutor to issue the subpoenas in secret or to otherwise issue them without notice 
to Defendant.” Id. 
 Here, the trial court erred in declining to suppress the bank record evidence. As in 
Thompson and Yount, Buttars had a privacy interest in the bank records. Thompson, 810 
P.2d 415 at 418-20; Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶24. Moreover, as explained above, the 
State obtained Buttars’s bank records through subpoenas that were illegal. Supra §I.A. 
“Thus, under Article I, [§]14…, the evidence obtained through the State's illegal 
subpoenas… must be suppressed unless an exception to the exclusionary rule applies.” 
Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶24. 
 The trial court determined that the good faith exception applied because the State 
obtained judicial review and “reasonably relied on the Court’s approval of the 
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subpoenas.” R.1089-90. But the circumstances did not warrant the application of the 
good faith exception.  
 Similar to Yount, a court in this case initially approved the issuance of subpoenas 
to Buttars’s banks. R.797-99, 818-20, 834-36, 839-42, 1086-87; Def.Ex.D, J; Yount, 2008 
UT App 102, Id.¶¶5, 26 n.3. The subpoenas then directed the banks to keep the 
subpoenas secret. Id. But the subpoenas did not spell out the procedure by which the 
prosecutor should issue the subpoenas. Id. Nor did the court “authorize the prosecutor to 
issue the subpoenas… without notice to [the] Defendant.” Id. In other words, the court-
approved secrecy provision authorized secrecy on the part of the banks—not the State. 
Moreover, the State’s failure to provide notice was chargeable solely to the State and its 
attorneys. Thus, the trial court erred in applying the good faith exception “because the 
error that rendered the subpoenas illegal was due to the attorney's conduct and the 
attorney's errors were not excused by any sort of reasonable reliance on the court's 
authorization.” Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶23. 
In short, the Fourth Amendment, Article I, §14, Thompson, and Yount required 
suppression of the bank records and all derivative testimony. Murray v. U.S., 487 U.S. 
533, 536-37 (1988) (the exclusionary rule “prohibits the introduction of derivative 
evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is the product of the primary evidence”). 
3. Prejudice. 
When an error is constitutional in nature, the State bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. 
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California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199,¶16 n.2, cert. 
granted, (applying the Chapman standard to state constitutional error).  
Here, admission of the bank record evidence violated Buttars’s state and federal 
constitutional rights. Accordingly, the State must prove that admission of the bank record 
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State cannot meet this burden. 
The bank record evidence was “crucial” evidence that went to all counts. R.1222. 
To convict Buttars of securities fraud, the jury had to find that Buttars (1) misstated a 
material fact, omitted a material fact necessary to complete a misleading predicate 
statement, or engaged in an act that operated as a fraud/deceit, and (2) acted willfully. See 
Utah Code §§61-1-1(2)-(3), 61-1-21. The State relied on the bank records to prove 
securities fraud, using them to try to demonstrate that Buttars: misstated facts by 
knowingly using investment money differently than what he represented to investors, 
R.5610, 5656-67, 5659-60; omitted to tell investors how he used the investments of 
previous investors, R.5654; and engaged in an act that operated as a fraud/deceit. R.5227-
28. Moreover, the instructions told jurors that securities fraud constituted “unlawful 
activity” upon which the pattern count could rest. R.1411, 1425-26. Thus, the bank 
records impacted the pattern count too. 
 Additionally, much of the State’s evidence centered on the bank records. The 
summaries depended on the bank records. See R.5175; St.Exs.26-32. Likewise, Curtis’s 




Without the bank record evidence, the State’s case rested predominantly on the 
testimony of the investors, to whom—the State argued—Buttars failed to disclose certain 
information. For instance, the State argued that Buttars was guilty of securities fraud 
because he omitted to tell investors about Ellipse, R.5614, 5617; the existence of prior 
allegations that Buttars misused Ellipse funds, R.5614-17, 5653; the potentially 
encumbered patents, R.5616, 5653; and the payment of salaries. R.5613. But this 
evidence was not overwhelming, and there was evidence upon which the jury could doubt 
these claims. 
Buttars had no “‘affirmative duty to disclose in the absence of a prior [, 
misleading] statement.’” State v. Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶10. And the evidence was 
vague and inconsistent as to what, if anything, Buttars said to the investors. R.5081 
(Mother testifying that Gerritsen provided most of the information about the investment); 
R.5078-79 (Mother testifying that she “th[ought] [she] might’ve had a phone call” with 
Buttars in which Buttars told her how her investment would be used); R.5532-33 
(evidence that Mother spoke with Buttars only once at a concert); R.5119 (Neighbor’s 
boyfriend testifying that Buttars gave a “presentation about what MovieBlitz was.”); 
R.5090-91, 5102, 5106, 5112 (Neighbor testifying that Buttars explained the “technical 
aspects,” including showing her the “patents he had gotten” and describing the 
technology); R.5098-99, 5133 (“it was stated” the money would be used in a particular 
way); R.5139 (it was “‘Mark LaCount [who] told us how great the company was’” and 
how “‘our money… was going to be used’”); R.5141-42 (“[LaCount] was initially the 
one that did all this stuff”).  
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Moreover, there was evidence that Buttars did not attend all the investor meetings. 
R.5118-19. In fact, evidence showed that it was Gerritsen and LaCount who primarily 
interacted with investors —investors who were Gerritsen and LaCount’s neighbors, 
friends, and relatives. R.5089, 5105, 5123, 5136,5139, 5141-42. By contrast, Buttars was 
the “brains” who lacked a personal connection with the investors. R.5106, 5136. Given 
the evidence, a jury could acquit upon a finding that Buttars did not utter any misleading 
predicate statements; he did not act willfully as he was not privy to any conversation 
during which the predicate statements were made; and/or he did not act willfully because 
he believed that LaCount and Gerritsen had already informed investors of all the 
necessary information. 
There was also evidence upon which a jury could find that Buttars believed all that 
he said (assuming he said anything). Indeed, evidence showed that Buttars was pursuing 
a legitimate technology, he believed in the company, and he “was trying to do things 
right.” R.4887-88, 4944-45, 4972, 5057,5232-35, 5295-96, 5632; St.Ex.26; Def.Ex.2,4,6. 
He believed in the technology enough to devote nearly $80,000 of his own money. 
Def.Ex.11-22. He had retained lawyers and applied for patents, and there was evidence of 
a licensing agreement between Ellipse and MovieBlitz. R.4866, 4888, 5534-35. 
Moreover, evidence showed that Buttars had done his research, compiling a detailed 
business plan with financial projections (contemplating salaries) and a sample 
subscription agreement that discussed the risks of investing. St.Ex.8. This was not a case 
involving some sham product. Buttars had a viable technology, but like many startups, 
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his company did not ultimately prevail. Given this evidence, a jury could find that Buttars 
believed everything he told investors and could acquit because he did not act willfully.  
Additionally, the jury’s acquittals on the theft counts indicate that jurors were 
conflicted about the State’s evidence and its theory of the case. State v. Richardson, 2013 
UT 50,¶44. Under these circumstances, the State cannot demonstrate that the admission 
of the bank record evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. The court erred in admitting Exhibits 26-32 because the underlying bank 
records constituted inadmissible hearsay.  
The Frontier bank records were inadmissible hearsay. While the State did not 
introduce the underlying bank records, it admitted summaries of the records (Exhibits 26-
32) pursuant to rule 1006. These summaries relied either solely or mostly on the Frontier 
records. R.916-17; St.Exs. 26-32. Where the underlying bank records were inadmissible 
hearsay, rule 1006 precluded the summaries’ admission. 
 Hearsay is a “statement that [] the declarant does not make while testifying at the 
current trial” and “a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” 
Utah R. Evid. 801(c), 802; Addendum I. Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls under an 
exception. Id. Admissible out-of-court statements may be the subject of a rule 1006 
summary. Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB&G Eng'g, Inc., 2013 UT App 146,¶¶19-20. Rule 
1006 provides that a “proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the 
content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently 
examined in court.” Utah R. Evid.1006; Addendum I. 
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But Utah courts agree that rule 1006 summaries “‘cannot be used as a cover for 
bringing [in] inadmissible hearsay.’” Sunridge, 2013 UT App 146,¶20. “Thus, the 
proponent of a summary must also show that the underlying records are admissible, 
which typically requires a showing that the records qualify under the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. Stated differently, rule 1006 summaries must be 
excluded if the underlying records do not qualify under a hearsay exception. Id. 
Here, the underlying bank records constituted inadmissible hearsay. The court 
correctly determined that the records did not qualify under the business records 
exception. But it incorrectly determined that they were admissible under the hearsay 
rule’s residual exception. Infra §I.B.1. Moreover, admission of the hearsay summaries 
prejudiced Buttars. Infra §I.B.2. 
1. The residual exception did not apply; thus, the bank records constituted 
inadmissible hearsay. 
“[T]he residual exception is a catchall provision that may be applied when a 
hearsay statement ‘is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 
804.’” State v. Clopten, 2015 UT 82,¶23. The rule states: 
(a) In General. Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is 
not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not 
specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: 
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness; 
(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and 
(4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice. 
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(b) Notice. The statement is admissible only if, before the trial or hearing, 
the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer 
the statement and its particulars, including the declarant's name and 
address, so that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it. 
Utah R. Evid. 807; Addendum I. 
“This exception… was intended for use in those rare cases where, although the 
out-of-court statement does not fit into a recognized exception, its admission is justified 
by the inherent reliability of the statement and the need for its admission.” State v. 
Nelson, 777 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah 1989). The residual hearsay exception is to be used 
“rarely,” “construed strictly,” and employed only in “exceptional circumstances” where 
“the high requirements” of the rule are met. Workman, 2005 UT 66,¶12; State v. Webster, 
2001 UT App 238,¶26. 
This case was not one of those rare and exceptionable cases. Specifically, the State 
did not meet rule 807’s requirements of notice, trustworthiness, reasonable efforts, or 
interests of justice.  
Notice. “[T]he purpose of the notice provision [is]… to afford the adverse party an 
opportunity to attack the statement's trustworthiness.” Webster, 2001 UT App 238,¶21. 
Without adequate notice of the proponent’s intent to rely on the residual exception, the 
opposing party need “only be prepared to contest whether the statement fits under one of 
the other specific, narrow exceptions.” Id. Accordingly, rule 807 requires reasonable 
notice not only of the proponent’s intent to rely on the hearsay statement, but also 
“requires notice of the proponent's intent to rely on th[e] [residual] exception.” Id.¶22. 
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Here, the court erred in determining that the State had provided proper notice. 
R.1220. The State initially proceeded on various theories for the bank records’ 
admissibility, none of which involved the residual hearsay exception. R.734-36, 862-85, 
910-61, 1058-1063. The evidentiary hearing addressing the bank records’ admissibility 
revolved around the State’s initial theories. R.855-56, 2933-3048. Only after the 
evidentiary hearing and several months of briefing, did the State raise the residual 
exception. R.1137-1145; 1177-1185. 
The court determined Buttars “had a fair opportunity to respond” to the State’s 
residual exception arguments. R.1220. But Buttars’s opportunity to attack the bank 
records’ trustworthiness was limited by the facts that came out at the evidentiary 
hearing—facts that were developed to challenge the admissibility of the bank records 
under “other specific, narrow exceptions.” Webster, 2001 UT App 238,¶21. Had the State 
provided notice prior to the evidentiary hearing, Buttars could have tailored his cross-
examination to address trustworthiness and introduced evidence relating to the 
trustworthiness issue. Absent an opportunity to develop the evidence toward this purpose, 
Buttars lacked a fair “opportunity to attack the statement's trustworthiness.” Id.  
Trustworthiness. The court erred in determining that the bank records had 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Our supreme court’s decision in 
Clopten is instructive on this point.  
The Clopten court held that statements were inadmissible under the residual 
exception because they did not meet trustworthiness requirement. 2015 UT 82,¶¶24-26. 
There, the supreme court considered the residual exception after first deeming the 
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statements inadmissible under the statement-against-interest exception. Id. The proponent 
asserted that the statements satisfied the residual exception’s trustworthiness requirement 
based on (1) “corroborat[ing] [] extrinsic evidence” and (2) their tendency to subject the 
declarant to potential harm. Id. The Clopten court rejected both contentions. Id. 
On the first point, the Clopten court stated that the “trustworthiness requirement is 
not satisfied by extrinsic corroborating evidence.” Id.¶25. “Instead, courts look to either 
the circumstances in which the hearsay statement was made or the content of the 
statement itself.” Id. To satisfy the trustworthiness element, “‘hearsay evidence... must 
possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to 
other evidence at trial.’” Id.  
 The supreme court likewise rejected the proponent’s contention that the statements 
had inherent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Id.¶26. That contention could 
be dismissed “for the same reasons that the statement-against-interest exception d[id] not 
apply.” Id. Thus, the Clopten court held that the statements were inadmissible where the 
proponent failed to show “that the statements ha[d] ‘equivalent circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness’ that [we]re different from other recognized exceptions to the hearsay 
rule.” Id.¶24 (emphasis added). 
Under Clopten, then, guarantees of trustworthiness must be both inherent and 
different from the recognized exceptions. Id.¶¶24-26. Indeed, the text of the rule suggests 
that the residual exception does not allow statements that have indicia of trustworthiness 
that are the same as—but fall short of—those contemplated under the recognized 
exceptions. Utah R. Evid.807. Rule 807 contemplates that the residual exception may be 
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applied when a hearsay statement “is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in 
Rule 803 or 804.” Id. If the statement offered under rule 807 has indicia of reliability that 
is the same as a recognized exception (for instance, the statement subjects the declarant to 
harm), then it is likely of a type that is “specifically covered” by a recognized exception. 
Admissibility is therefore governed by the recognized exception—not the residual 
exception. Keller v. Martinez, 2014 UT App 2,¶9 (“statutes that address specific 
circumstances ‘control over more general ones’”). 
Moreover, if the statement does not satisfy the recognized exception, then it lacks 
circumstantial indicia of trustworthiness and fails under the residual exception for the 
“same reasons” it fails under the recognized exception. Clopten, 2015 UT 82,¶26.  
Indeed, the text of the rule requires “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.” Utah. R. Evid.807. A statement that does not comport with the 
requirements of the applicable recognized exception cannot have “equivalent” guarantees 
of trustworthiness. Id. Otherwise the recognized exception would have allowed it. 
 The residual exception “is not a basis to admit hearsay when the proponent of the 
evidence has failed to comply with the foundation requirements of other [hearsay] 
exceptions… under which the proffered statement might have been admitted, had the 
conditions precedent for their application been observed.” Clifton v. Gusto Records, Inc., 
852 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1988) (unpublished decision). Instead, the residual exception is 
reserved for “exceptional” cases, Workman, 2005 UT 66,¶12; Webster, 2001 UT App 
238,¶26, where the recognized exceptions do not apply due to the unique character of the 
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evidence and the “different” indicia of trustworthiness that it brings. Clopten, 2015 UT 
82,¶24. That was not the case here.  
 In this case, the court made two fundamental errors in its application of the law. 
First, the court expressly relied on extrinsic corroborating evidence to support the 
admissibility of the bank records—specifically, the testimony of Nesbit and Curtis. 
R.1221. But Clopten held that trustworthiness must be inherent; the “trustworthiness 
requirement is not satisfied by extrinsic corroborating evidence.” Clopten, 2015 UT 
82,¶25. Thus, the court was wrong to rely on “extrinsic evidence to support” 
trustworthiness. R.1221. 
 Second, the inherent indicators of trustworthiness the court relied upon—for 
instance, that the records were kept in the usual course of business—were not “different 
from other recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Clopten, 2015 UT 82,¶24. In other 
words, the court merely looked to the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness 
required by the business records exception—an exception for which the court found the 
proper foundation lacking. R.1153. Records that did not meet the requirements of the 
business records exception lacked “equivalent” guarantees of trustworthiness. If the 
guarantees were truly equivalent, then the business records exception would have allowed 
them. Utah. R. Evid. 803(6), 807; Addendum I. 
 Even without considering the court’s misapplication of the law, the record reveals 
that the State (the hearsay’s proponent) did not meet its burden of establishing 
trustworthiness. For instance, the State failed to introduce the underlying bank records 
themselves, producing only the summaries instead. This deprived the court of the 
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opportunity to properly examine the trustworthiness of the Frontier records. U.S. v. 
Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2013) (the trustworthiness analysis “is a highly fact-
specific inquiry”). Moreover, the hearsay’s trustworthiness was belied by record evidence 
showing that the Frontier records had been “jumbled in storage.” R.2963-64; Def.Ex O 
(9/14/2015 Hr’g).   
In short, the State did not meet its trustworthiness burden and the court misapplied 
the law. Thus, the court erred in determining that the bank records satisfied rule 807’s 
trustworthiness requirement.  
Reasonable efforts to obtain more probative evidence. Although Rule 807 does not 
contain an explicit unavailability requirement, “it still requires the proponent… to 
undertake reasonable efforts to get better evidence, and Rule 807(a) only applies if 
another exception does not.” U.S. v. Turner, 561 F. App'x 312, 321 (5th Cir. 2014); 
accord N.D. v. A.B., 2003 UT App 215,¶18.  
 Here, the bank records/summaries—as proffered by the State—were not the most 
probative evidence of Buttars’s expenditures. R.1222. Of greater probative value were 
records that a custodian showed to be accurate and trustworthy–that is, regular entries of 
Buttars’ expenditures made near the time of the transaction and kept in the ordinary 
course of business. Utah R. Evid. 803(6). 
Calling the custodian to testify was one way the State could have ensured that the 
most probative evidence of Buttars’s expenditures went to the jury. But the record reveals 
no attempt on the part of the State to call a custodian. See R.2919, 3117, 3136, 3244. Nor 
did the court identify any reasonable efforts to do so. R.1222. On the contrary, the State 
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took the position that it “d[id] not have to bring in a records custodian from these banks.” 
R.3136. This position contradicts both the letter and spirit of rule 807, which is reserved 
for truly exceptional circumstances involving a showing of “need.” Nelson, 777 P.2d at 
482; Workman, 2005 UT 66,¶12; Webster, 2001 UT App 238,¶26; Turner, 561 F. App'x 
at 321. Accordingly, the court erred in determining that the State satisfied this prong. 
N.D., 2003 UT App 215,¶18. 
Interests of justice.  For many of the reasons already discussed, admitting the bank 
records under the residual exception did not serve the purposes of the rules and the 
interests of justice. Rule 102 states that “[t]he[] rules should be construed so as to… 
promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and 
securing a just determination.” Utah R. Evid.102. The record does not reveal how 
admitting the bank records through the residual exception—without the custodian 
certifications that would otherwise be required under the business records exception—
best serves the end of ascertaining the truth. N.D., 2003 UT App 215,¶20. 
The firmly rooted exceptions to our hearsay rules serve the interests of justice by 
ensuring the trustworthiness of out-of-court statements. State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197, 
1199 (Utah 1989). Where, as here, rule 807 is used to do an end-run around the 
established exceptions and their trustworthiness requirements, neither the purposes of the 
rules nor the interests of justice are served. Indeed, the business records exception would 
be of little use if courts could bypass it in favor of the residual exception whenever the 
requisite foundation was lacking. Such a prospect is even more troubling when the record 
reveals that the State did not even take reasonable efforts to establish the requisite 
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foundation. See R.3136; N.D., 2003 UT App 215,¶20. The court did not weigh these 
important considerations. 
In short, the court erred in determining that the Frontier records qualified under 
rule 807. The records were thus inadmissible hearsay. And because the underlying bank 
records were inadmissible, the Exhibit 26-32 summaries were inadmissible to the extent 
that they relied on the Frontier records.  
2. Prejudice. 
An error is prejudicial when “there [i]s ‘a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for the defendant’” “without the error.” State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 
1048 (Utah 1984). 
Here, Buttars was prejudiced by the admission of Exhibits 26-32. As discussed, 
the bank records went to all securities fraud counts as well as the pattern count. Supra 
p.28 And the State relied upon the bank records to prove its case. Id. Exhibits 26-32 
relied either solely or mostly on the inadmissible Frontier records. R.916-17; St.Exs.26-
32. Without the Frontier records, jurors were left with a comparatively small number of 
transactions from a time that predated the investments of the testifying investors as well 
as a list of investments (mostly from 2007). Id. The summaries, in other words, rose and 
fell with the Frontier records.  
The court’s erroneous ruling allowed the State to use summaries as substantive 
evidence. R.1219.7 The State did just that, making the summaries a “crucial” part of its 
                                                             
7 As noted, the trial court declined to rule on whether the bank records/summaries 
were admissible under rule 703. R.1219. The court correctly noted, nevertheless, that had 
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case. R.1222. Not only did the State admit the summaries as exhibits, but it also elicited 
detailed testimony from Curtis highlighting various transactions and statements contained 
in the summaries. E.g., R.5175-204.  
Moreover, the summaries were not cumulative. This is true even assuming that 
Curtis could rely on the summaries to form his in-court conclusions. The summaries 
constituted the only evidence that purported to show the actual flow and source of funds. 
R.1222. Unlike the conclusion testimony of Curtis, the records were allegedly objective 
and unbiased. The State recognized as much, arguing that the bank records/summaries 
“don’t have a motive. Their credibility’s not at issue. [They] are cold, hard facts.” 
R.5651. But without an opportunity to review the “hard facts” for themselves, jurors had 
reason to be skeptical of any bald conclusions about the bank records that Curtis might 
have given. Additionally, the record reveals that the summaries were available to the 
jurors during deliberations. R.5668. This allowed jurors to place particular emphasis on 
the summaries. 
Meanwhile, the State’s case was not otherwise overwhelming. As detailed above, 
the State’s remaining evidence—chiefly, the investor testimony—did not provide a 
strong basis for the jury to convict. Supra pp.29-31. In fact, the jury acquitted on all theft 
counts, indicating that jurors were conflicted about the State’s case. Richardson, 2013 UT 
50,¶44. 
                                                             
it admitted the evidence under rule 703, the evidence could “only [be used] for the 
purpose of assisting the jury in evaluating an expert’s opinion.” Id. 
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 Moreover, absent the summaries, there was evidence upon which the jury could 
have acquitted. Supra pp.29-31. For instance, jurors could have doubted that Buttars 
acted willfully, finding that Buttars believed all that he said; was not privy to the 
utterance of any misleading predicate statements; and/or he believed that LaCount and 
Gerritsen had already informed investors of all the necessary information. Id. Thus, it is 
reasonably likely that but for the summaries’ admission, Buttars would have enjoyed a 
more favorable result. 
C. Exhibits 26-32 were inadmissible under rule 1006 because they did not prove 
the content of the underlying bank records. 
 
The summaries did not prove the content of the underlying bank records; instead, 
they contained information outside of the bank records and were augmented with State-
drawn conclusions. Moreover, counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the bank 
records on these grounds. 
1. The summaries did not accurately prove the content of the underlying bank 
records. 
 
Rule 1006 permits summaries that “prove the content of voluminous writings, 
recordings, or photographs.” Utah R. Evid.1006 (emphasis added). If the summary does 
not accurately summarize the source materials, it does not “prove the content” of the 
underlying evidence. Id. Moreover, only “writings, recordings, or photographs” may be 
summarized; this means that a person’s personal knowledge, opinions, or theories cannot 
be the subject of a rule 1006 summary. Id.; see U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Scott, 673 N.W.2d 
646, 655 (S.D. 2003). 
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Rule 1006’s plain language, then, places several limitations on the admissibility of 
summaries. To be admissible, a summary must “summarize[] the information contained 
in the underlying documents accurately, correctly, and in a nonmisleading manner.” U.S. 
v. Bray, 139 F.3d 1104, 1110 (6th Cir.1998). “Charts and summaries are… inadmissible 
if they contain information not present in the… material on which they are based.” U.S. v. 
Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 25 (1st Cir.1984), modified on other grounds by U.S. v. Piper, 35 
F.3d 611 (1st Cir.1994). 
Moreover, the summary must not be “embellished by or annotated with the 
conclusions of or inferences drawn by the proponent.” Bray, 139 F.3d at 1110. “Care 
must be taken to insure that [rule 1006] summaries accurately reflect the contents of the 
underlying documents and do not function as pedagogical devices that unfairly 
emphasize part of the proponent's proof or create the impression that disputed facts have 
been conclusively established.” Drougas, 748 F.2d at 25. 
Here, the State’s summaries did more than summarize the content of the 
underlying bank records. First, Curtis compiled the summaries based on sources 
extraneous to the bank record data. R.3245; see R.3015; R.6118. The court found that the 
summaries “were based in part on the bank records, but they also included evidence that 
[]Curtis reviewed… [like] police reports and things like that, so he had additional 
information about the case.... Curtis also testified that he did some followup looking into 
individual transactions.” R.3245; see also R.3015; R.6118. Moreover, the record suggests 
that in creating the summaries, Curtis relied on information provided by an unidentified 
Wells Fargo fraud investigator and another non-testifying witness. R.2677; see R.6125; 
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St.Ex. 26. Curtis, therefore, compiled the summaries using information “not present” in 
the underlying records. Drougas, 748 F.2d at 25. 
Second, the record reveals that Exhibits 26-32 summarized information that did 
not qualify as “writings, recordings, or photographs.” Utah R. Evid.1006. Curtis 
acknowledged, for example, that he compiled the “questionable payments” portion of the 
summaries based on his “involvement with the facts in the case, review of the file, 
interview of some of the witnesses, including alleged victims, and [his] general 
[investigation] experience.” R.3017; see R.6118; R.6121-22. Thus, the summaries were 
partially based on testimonial evidence and Curtis’s personal knowledge/experience—
sources that were not the proper subject of a rule 1006 summary. Utah R. Evid.1006. 
Third, the summaries were embellished with conclusions and inferences drawn by 
the State. Bray, 139 F.3d at 1110. The summaries did not merely list Buttars’s various 
financial transactions, but went a step further by categorizing certain payments as 
“questionable” and “potential[ly] legitimate.” St.Exs.26-32. These were State-drawn 
conclusions that did not prove the content of the underlying bank records. R.3017. 
The summaries also concluded that Buttars “commingled” funds. St.Exs.27-31. 
And commingling, Curtis later testified, was something that is characteristic of “fraud” 
and “deceit.” R.5227-28. The summaries also made assumptions about which payments 
constituted “investor money.” Compare St.Ex. 26 at 1 (categorizing the payments of 
, and  as “investor money”), with St.Ex. 32 




marked ” on the payment; and a memo line marked 
“Bnf: David Buttars” on the payment).  
In short, the summaries were based on extra-bank record information and were 
embellished with the gloss of the State. The Exhibit 26-32 summaries, therefore, were 
inadmissible under rule 1006. 
2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the summaries on the 
grounds that they did not accurately prove the content of the bank records. 
“When analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [this Court] must 
make two distinct determinations: (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient in that 
it ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’; and (2) whether counsel's 
performance was prejudicial in that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” 
State v. King, 2010 UT App 396,¶30. 
Counsel’s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness when 
it “would not have been futile to object” and this Court can “perceive no tactical reason 
why such an objection was not made.” State v. Jordan, 2018 UT App 187,¶51. Moreover, 
counsel performs deficiently when “there is only upside” to pursuing a legally viable 
action and “no reasonable lawyer would have found an advantage” in proceeding as 
counsel did.  State v. Barela, 2015 UT 22,¶27.  
In this case, counsel performed deficiently by failing to lodge an accuracy/content-
based objection to Exhibits 26-32 on the grounds described above. Supra §I.C.1. As 




records, as required by rule 1006. Id. Thus, an objection in this regard “would not have 
been futile.” Jordan, 2018 UT App 187,¶51. 
Moreover, there is “no tactical reason why such an objection was not made.” Id. 
Before trial, the defense attacked the admissibility of the bank record summaries on 
multiple grounds. E.g., R.766-87, 910-61. The record thus suggests that counsel’s 
objective was to exclude the bank records. Id. Failing to object on accuracy/content 
grounds was inconsistent with counsel’s exclusion objective. Id. This suggests that 
counsel’s failure to object was not strategy, but an oversight. Id. 
The misleading summaries also put before the jury damaging, State-drawn 
conclusions about disputed issues. St.Exs.26-32. An objection would have forced the 
State to remove all conclusions and extra-bank record information. And an objection 
would have provided jurors with an accurate understanding of the bank records’ content 
and would have removed the impression that disputed evidence was conclusively proven 
in the records. Under these circumstances, “there [wa]s only upside” in lodging an 
accuracy/content-based objection and “no reasonable lawyer would have found an 
advantage” in proceeding as counsel did. Barela, 2015 UT 22,¶27. 
Moreover, it is reasonably likely that but for counsel’s failure to object, Buttars 
would have enjoyed a more favorable result. As detailed above, the summaries 
constituted “critical” evidence that went to all counts. Supra p.28. Furthermore, the State 
relied upon the summaries to try to prove its case. Id.  And, as discussed, the jury had 
reason to doubt that the investors’ testimony was enough to satisfy the elements of the 
offenses. Supra pp.29-31. 
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The conclusions drawn by the summaries also went to key disputed issues. For 
instance, the State argued that Buttars made illegitimate or “questionable” purchases and 
comingled funds. St.Ex.26-32. The defense disputed this, eliciting believable evidence 
that Buttars’s expenditures were legitimate business transactions. R.5248-5268, 5295-
5307,5313-18; see, e.g., R.5521, 5295-96, Def.Exs.1,24. Yet, the summaries gave the 
State an advantage by creating the impression that these “disputed facts ha[d] been 
conclusively established.” Drougas, 748 F.2d at 25. Moreover, categorizing certain 
payments as investor money was an assumption beneficial to the State. St.Ex.26, 32. 
Indeed, this assumption fit into the State’s narrative that Buttars had a pattern of 
“misusing investor funds”; substantiated its claim that Buttars engaged in a course of 
conduct that operated as a fraud; and bolstered its contention that Buttars omitted to tell 
investors how he used the funds of past “investors.” R.5226-29, 5610, 5654-67,5659-60. 
Meanwhile, absent the summaries’ conclusions, the jury had reason to believe that 
Buttars’s expenditures were legitimate and associated, for instance, with bringing the 
product to market and registering the company in Nevada. Evidence showed that Buttars 
did, in fact, register the company in Nevada. R.5522. Moreover, the defense elicited 
testimony that bringing the product to market could involve a host of different 
expenditures. R.5239-40,5256-57. 
Evidence also showed that any misplaced payments could be accounted for in tax 
paperwork (the State pulled Buttars’s taxes, but did not introduce them at trial or provide 
them to Curtis). R.5233, 5306-08, 5317-18. And defense counsel elicited evidence that 
48 
 
Buttars “was trying to do things right,” and if he made mistakes in his accounting, it was 
not willful. E.g., R.5232-35, 5295-96, 5632; St.Ex.4,8,26; Def.Ex.2,4,6. 
On cross-examination, defense counsel went through the various transactions in 
detail, eliciting testimony that many of the payments could be proper business expenses. 
R.5248-5268, 5295-5307,5313-18; see, e.g., R.5521, 5295-96, Def.Exs.1,24. This 
testimony was believable too. For instance, the defense produced evidence that the 
payments to Buttars’s “lawyer/ex-wife” was for relevant patent work. R.4866-67; 
Def.Ex.24. Moreover, the BAC Home Loans payment was made with a check that noted 
“corporate office rent” in the memo. Def.Ex.1. Indeed, evidence showed that Buttars 
conducted business out of his home and had hosted business travelers at his home in the 
past. R.4891-93, 4958. That Buttars paid himself a salary was also believable, given that 
he had previously drawn a salary and he had the technical background necessary to 
develop the product.  R.4856, 4863, 4886, 4889-91, 4944, 4972, 5032. Thus, the jury 
could have doubted that Buttars’s expenditures were “questionable.”  
Additionally, the record suggests the summaries were available to jurors during 
deliberations. R.5668. This created a danger that the State’s conclusions/assumptions 
were unduly emphasized to jurors. State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234,¶¶35-41. 
That the State did not introduce the underlying bank records made matters worse. 
The summaries were admitted as substantive evidence in lieu of the bank records 
themselves. This meant jurors had no way to separate argument/assumption from the 
underlying content of the bank records. For all the jury knew, the underlying records 
themselves—rather than the State’s expert—could have flagged the transactions as 
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“questionable.” St.Ex.26-31. The State gave argument supporting this belief; it claimed 
the records “don’t have a motive. Their credibility’s not at issue. [They] are cold, hard 
facts.” R.6593-94. But the bank record summaries were more than just “hard facts.” They 
represented the State’s conclusions and arguments about key aspects of the case—
conclusions that were disguised as substantive evidence and available to jurors 
throughout deliberations. Under these circumstances, it is reasonably likely that Buttars’s 
would have enjoyed a more favorable result but for counsel’s failure to object. 
II. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by proposing/allowing an 
incorrect instruction on the definition of “willfulness.” 
Instruction 42 incorrectly told jurors that Buttars acted willfully if he had the 
conscious desire to avoid facts. Infra §II.A. Proposing/allowing this instruction 
constituted deficient performance that prejudiced Buttars. Infra §§II.B-C.  
A. The jury was incorrectly instructed on the definition of willfulness. 
As charged, the securities fraud statute makes it unlawful for a person, “in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security,” to directly/indirectly: 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or  
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code §61-1-1(2)-(3); Addendum I.  
 These sections “must be read in conjunction with section 61-1-21,” which 
specifies “willfully” as the requisite mental state for a criminal violation. State v. Larsen, 
865 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Utah 1993); Utah Code §§61-1-21(1)(a), 61-1-21(2); Addendum I. 
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Thus, to be guilty of a criminal violation of §61-1-1(2), the defendant must have 
“willfully omit[ted] or misstate[d] material facts.” Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1360. To be guilty 
of a criminal violation of §61-1-1(3), the defendant must have “willfully engag[ed] in 
conduct ‘which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.’” Fibro 
Trust v. Brahman Financial, 1999 UT 13,¶15. 
Willfulness is a “highly culpable mental state”—the highest under Utah law 
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1360; Utah Code §76-2-103. “A person engages in conduct… 
willfully… when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause 
the result.” Id. §76-2-103(1). In the context of securities fraud, “‘[t]o act willfully… 
means to act deliberately and purposefully, as distinguished from merely accidentally or 
inadvertently.’” Fibro Trust, 1999 UT 13,¶15.  
“[W]illfulness ‘does not require an intent to violate the law or to injure another.’” 
State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434,¶13. But it is not enough to show that the defendant 
ought to have been aware of the risk. See Utah Code §76-2-103(4). Nor is it enough to 
show that he was aware of the risk but disregarded it. See id. §76-2-103(3). It is not even 
enough to show that he was “aware that his conduct [was] reasonably certain to cause the 
result.” Id. §76-2-103(2); see State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55,¶36.  
Rather, “the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused 
‘desired to engage in the conduct or cause the result.’” Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1360; State v. 
Martinez, 2000 UT App 320,¶12 n.5 (intent “require[s] actual knowledge… and thus 
turn[s] on the defendant’s subjective mental state”), aff’d, 2002 UT 80; Silver v. Auditing 
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Div., 820 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah 1991) (“The usual meaning of the term ‘intent’ is that one 
must have a conscious objective… to accomplish the prohibited end.”).  
Thus, under §61-1-1, the State must prove that it was the defendant’s “conscious 
objective or desire to” misstate a material fact, omit a material fact necessary to complete 
a misleading predicate statement, or engage in an act that operated as a fraud. Utah Code 
§§61-1-1(2)-(3), 76-2-103(1); Fibro Trust, 1999 UT 13,¶15; Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1358 
n.3. 
Here, the instructions defining willfulness were incorrect and/or misleading. The 
court provided three willfulness instructions. R.1424, 1412-13; Addendum B. First, the 
court gave Instruction 52, a stock instruction that included the statutory definition of 
willfulness: “A person engages in conduct… willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result.” R.1424. 
 Second, Instruction 41, repeated the statutory definition and provided additional 
State-favorable guidance:  
… 
A defendant acts willfully if it was his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result—not that it was the defendant’s 
conscious desire or objective to violate the law, nor that the defendant knew 
that he was committing fraud in the sale of the security. 
R.1412.  
 Third, the court gave Instruction 42, an instruction drafted by defense counsel. 
R.1297,1413. The first two sentences offer a general definition, stating: 
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To act willfully it must be a person’s conscious objective or desire to 
engage in certain conduct or cause a certain result. A person acts willfully if 
he acts purposefully and not because of mistake or accident.  
Id. Then, the remainder of the instruction provides a case-specific definition, which 
states: 
In the context of willful misstatements or omissions of material facts, 
willfully implies knowledge of the falsity of the misstatements and 
knowledge of the omitted facts and knowledge of the materiality of the 
misstatement(s). That knowledge can be inferred if the defendant 
consciously avoided the existence of a fact or facts; however, the defendant 
cannot be convicted if he was merely negligent, careless or foolish. He must 
have acted with the conscious objective or desire to ignore a material fact 
or facts.  
R.1413 (emphasis added). 
The italicized portion of Instruction 42 renders the definition of willfulness 
incorrect and/or misleading in two fundamental ways. First, Instruction 42 incorrectly 
imports conscious avoidance principles into the definition of willfulness. E.g., R.1413 
(knowledge may be inferred when a “defendant consciously avoid[s] the existence of… 
facts”). The conscious avoidance doctrine, a.k.a. “willful blindness,” U.S. v. Reyes, 302 
F.3d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 2002), holds that “knowledge of a fact... may be found when the jury 
is persuaded that the defendant consciously avoided learning [of a] fact while aware of a 
high probability of its existence.” U.S. v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2003). But 
in Moore, this Court held that Utah’s securities fraud statutes do not “impose criminal 
liability for acts amounting to willful blindness or a violation of a duty to know.” Moore, 
2015 UT App 112,¶10.  
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It is worth noting that courts that have embraced this doctrine impose a far more 
stringent standard than that articulated by Instruction 42. Indeed, to “give willful 
blindness an appropriately limited scope that surpasses recklessness and negligence,” the 
Supreme Court requires that a “defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high 
probability that a fact exists.” Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 
(2011) (emphasis added); see U.S. v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 566-67 (2d Cir. 2010). Even 
the definition of recklessness contemplates awareness of a “substantial and unjustifiable” 
risk that a fact exists. Utah Code §76-2-103(3). In effect, Instruction 42 supported a belief 
that willfulness involved conduct that would not even amount to recklessness.  
Second, the instruction misarticulated the conduct that must be the object of a 
defendant’s objective/desire. R.1413. While initially stating that a defendant must act 
with the objective/desire “to engage in the conduct,” Instruction 42 then went on to 
erroneously identify the pertinent “conduct” as the decision to ignore facts. Id. (the 
defendant “must have acted with the conscious… desire to ignore a material fact”). But 
the object of the defendant’s “conscious objective or desire” is not ignorance of facts; it is 
the misstatement of a material fact, the omission of a material fact necessary to complete 
a misleading predicate statement, or an act that operates as a fraud. Utah Code §§61-1-
1(2)-(3), 76-2-103(1); Fibro Trust, 1999 UT 13,¶15; Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1358 n.3.  
Moreover, consciously ignoring the existence of material facts is not criminal. 
There is no duty to know and no duty to disclose in the absence of a prior misleading 
statement. Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶10; State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382,¶42. There 
is a duty, however, to refrain from making misstatements and refrain from uttering half-
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truths that mislead. Utah Code §§61-1-1(2)-(3), 61-1-21. It is the willful violation of 
these duties that is a crime. Id. Tethering a defendant’s objective/desire to the ignorance 
of facts significantly distorted the mental state required for securities fraud. 
In short, the combined effect of both of these errors was to incorrectly focus the 
jury’s analysis on whether Buttars was purposeful in his ignorance. And as a result, the 
instructions allowed jurors to convict based on non-criminal conduct. 
The remaining instructions did not cure these errors. The jury was given the 
abstract definition of willfulness. R.1413, 1424. But the challenged portion expounded 
upon the general definition with an erroneous case-specific definition. R.1413. And it 
was the erroneous case-specific definition that jurors would consider controlling. State v. 
Reigelsperger, 2017 UT App 101,¶96 (“juries can… conclude that a general mens rea 
requirement applies to all elements… except where a specific mental state is expressly 
indicated” (emphasis added)). 
Telling jurors they could not convict based on negligence, accident, or 
carelessness did not help either. R.1413. This language had no curative value because 
Instruction 42 incorrectly shifted the analysis away from whether the defendant 
purposefully or accidently misstated facts, and placed the focus on whether the defendant 
was purposeful or accidental in his ignorance. Id. Thus, the accident/negligence language 
served only to remind jurors that a defendant cannot be guilty for accidentally or 
negligently ignoring facts. Moreover, any good that came from the portion requiring 
“knowledge” of the omitted facts/misstatements was immediately undone by the next 
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sentence, which instructed jurors that they could “infer[]” knowledge from conscious 
avoidance. Id.  
Buttars recognizes that Moore appeared to approve of the language he challenges, 
stating: “Larsen requires that [the defendant’s] convictions rest on facts indicating, for 
example, that he ‘made a willful misstatement or omission of a material fact’ by having 
‘consciously avoided the existence of a fact or facts’ or, in other words, that [the 
defendant] ‘acted with a conscious objective or desire to ignore a material fact or facts.’” 
Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶17. But Moore’s language of approval may be regarded as 
nonbinding dicta, Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20,¶28, as it was “not necessary to sustain 
the decision” of the Moore court. E. Bench Irrigation Co. v. State, 300 P.2d 603, 606 
(Utah 1956).  
  If the language was not dicta, then Buttars asks this Court to overrule it. Before 
overruling precedent, this Court considers (1) the authority’s “persuasiveness” and the 
“reasoning on which the precedent was originally based”; and (2) “how firmly the 
precedent has become established.” In Interest of B.T.B., 2018 UT App 157,¶39. 
 Here, both factors favor disavowal. First, Moore’s conscious avoidance language 
rests on tenuous legal grounds. Larsen did not—as the Moore court suggested—embrace 
the conscious avoidance language. See Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355. The conscious avoidance 
language appears to originate from Chapman, which merely quoted the language because 
it appeared in one of the instructions given at the defendant’s trial. State v. Chapman, 
2014 UT App 255,¶11. Indeed, Chapman, an insufficient evidence case, had nothing to 
say about the propriety of the conscious avoidance language. Id. The challenged 
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language, therefore, comes not from reasoned analysis, but from an instruction given in 
Chapman. 
Second, Moore’s conscious avoidance language has not become firmly entrenched 
in Utah’s jurisprudence. Moore was issued fairly recently. And the conscious avoidance 
language is inconsistent with other legal principles—including Moore’s own holding, 
which expressly rejects willful blindness principles. 2015 UT App 112,¶10. For this 
reason, it is also unlikely that many parties have relied on the language. Accordingly, this 
Court should overrule Moore’s conscious avoidance language because it incorrectly 
defines willfulness. 
In short, the instructions in Buttars’s case did not adequately instruct jurors on the 
mental state necessary to commit securities fraud.  
B. Deficient performance. 
Counsel performs deficiently when his “conduct f[alls] below an objective 
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” State v. Ring, 2018 UT 
19,¶35 (quotation marks omitted). For instance, counsel performs deficiently by failing to 
object to instructions that understate the mens rea element. Barela, 2015 UT 22,¶¶26-27. 
Likewise, it is deficient performance to allow instructions that “reduce the State's burden 
of proof” and permit jurors to convict under “impermissible scenarios.” Grunwald, 2018 
UT App 46,¶42. 
Here, counsel performed deficiently by proposing the conscious 
avoidance/ignorance language and allowing it to go to the jury. The defense argued that 
the “case boil[ed] down to” what Buttars’s mental state was. R.5635-36, 5627, 5645-46. 
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Yet, the instructions “understat[ed]” the willfulness requirement by allowing jurors to 
convict based on conduct that would not even amount to recklessness. Supra pp.52-55. 
Moreover, the instructions allowed jurors to convict under “impermissible scenarios.” 
Grunwald, 2018 UT App 46,¶42. That is, jurors could convict if they found that Buttars 
acted with an objective other than the desire to misstate a fact or omit a fact necessary to 
complete a misleading predicate statement. Id.  Thus, the “error[] had the effect of 
reducing the State's burden of proof at trial.” 2018 UT App 46,¶42. And no reasonable 
trial strategy would justify allowing an incorrect instruction that made it easier for jurors 
to convict. See id.  
Moore’s language of approval did not change this. 2015 UT App 112,¶17. 
Counsel’s duties extend to investigating issues and performing tasks beyond the obvious. 
See State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16,¶¶11-21, 179 P.3d 792; State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26,¶32, 135 
P.3d 864. Thus, counsel had a duty to investigate the soundness of the conscious 
avoidance language in Moore and ensure that the incorrect language did not go to the 
jury. The failure to do so was deficient performance. 
If this Court determines Moore’s conscious avoidance language precludes a 
showing of deficient performance, then Buttars asks this Court to reach this issue under 
the exceptional circumstances doctrine. 
The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a “safety device,” to assure that 
“manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal.” State 
v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The Utah Supreme Court, for instance, has 
“employed the ‘exceptional circumstances’ rubric where… the settled interpretation of 
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law colored the failure to have raised an issue.” Irwin, 924 P.2d at 10; State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). 
Unique procedural circumstances exist here. This Court’s “interpretation of law” 
in Moore was the basis for the erroneous instruction. Id.; Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶17. 
Moreover, if this Court finds that Moore excused counsel’s actions, the exceptional 
circumstances doctrine is Buttars’s only “safety device” for obtaining review of the 
merits. Irwin, 924 P.2d at 8. As shown, the erroneous language significantly distorted the 
willfulness requirement. Supra pp.52-55. Moreover, as explained below, the error 
prejudiced Buttars. Infra §II.C. Failure to consider the merits of this issue would be an 
“injustice” to Buttars and to future defendants whose juries are instructed using the same 
erroneous language from Moore. Thus, this case is appropriate for exceptional 
circumstances review. 
Be it through ineffective assistance or exceptional circumstances, Buttars asks the 
Court to reach the merits of this issue.  
C. Prejudice. 
There was a reasonable probability of a different result but for the challenged 
language in Instruction 42. Supra p.45 (setting forth prejudice test). If the jury had been 
properly instructed on the definition of “willfulness,” there was evidence from which 
jurors could have acquitted Buttars of securities fraud. And where the instruction error 
impacts the securities fraud charges, this Court should reverse on the pattern count 
because it rests on the underlying securities charges. R.1411,1425-26; supra p.28. 
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Moreover, the court instructed jurors that the erroneous definition of willfulness applied 
to the pattern count. Id. 
The defense argued that the “case boil[ed] down to… what [Buttars’s] intent was.” 
R.5635-36, 5627, 5645-46. And it asked jurors to acquit because Buttars did not act 
willfully. Id. There was evidence to support that claim.  
The evidence was vague and inconsistent as to what, if anything, Buttars said to 
the investors. Supra p.29; E.g., R.5078-81. And if he said anything, evidence showed (as 
argued above) that Buttars believed everything he said, supra pp.30-31, and used investor 
funds for legitimate purposes. Supra pp.47-48. Indeed, the jury acquitted on all theft 
counts despite the State’s contention that Buttars was guilty of theft because he accepted 
investor funds knowing that he was going to use the money differently than what he 
represented to investors. R.5659-60. This suggests that jurors rejected the notion that 
Buttars willfully misrepresented how he intended to use investor funds. 
Moreover, as discussed, there was evidence that Buttars did not attend all the 
meetings with investors. R.5118-19. And importantly, evidence showed that it was 
Gerritsen and LaCount who primarily interacted with investors—investors who were 
Gerritsen and LaCount’s neighbors, friends, and relatives. R.5089, 5105,5123, 5136, 
5139, 5141-42; e.g., R.5139 (it was “Mark LaCount [who] told us how great the company 
was” and how “our money… was going to be used”); R.5532-33 (evidence that Mother 
spoke with Buttars only once at a concert). 
Given this evidence, it is reasonably likely a jury could find that Buttars was not 
privy to the conversation during which the predicate statements were made. They could 
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also find that Buttars thought it was likely that LaCount and Gerritsen had already 
informed investors of any necessary information. Such a belief was reasonable given the 
relationships and dealings LaCount and Gerritsen shared with the investors. From this, a 
jury could reasonably doubt that Buttars acted willfully, finding that he was unaware of 
the utterance of any misstatements or misleading predicate statements. 
But the instructions told jurors that it did not matter if Buttars actually knew about 
the misstatements or misleading predicate statements. They could “infer[]” that 
knowledge if he “consciously avoided the existence of a fact or facts.” R.1413. For 
instance, the instruction permitted jurors to infer knowledge if Buttars was aware of some 
possibility that LaCount made misleading omissions, but Buttars consciously chose not to 
investigate his suspicions. As another example: even if jurors found that Buttars believed 
that the patents were unencumbered (there was evidence of a licensing agreement 
between MOVIEblitz and Ellipse), the instructions permitted a finding of guilt if Buttars 
consciously ignored some remote risk that Romney might have a claim to them. R.5534-
35, 5640. Indeed, Instruction 42 did not specify the level of risk that must be ignored 
before jurors could infer knowledge. R.1413; supra p.53. Thus, this Court should reverse 
on all counts because the erroneous instructions prejudiced Buttars. 
III. This Court should grant Buttars a new trial on all counts because the State 
presented expert testimony, argument, and jury instructions that misstated 
the law surrounding a defendant’s disclosure obligations under the securities 
fraud statute. 
When given, expert testimony, prosecutorial argument, and jury instructions must 
accurately state the law. See Jordan, 2018 UT App 187,¶¶42-52; Stringham, 957 P.2d at 
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607-08; State v. Bird, 2015 UT 7,¶14. Here, the State presented expert testimony, 
argument, and jury instructions that misstated the law and expanded the conduct 
criminalized by the securities fraud statute. To the extent counsel failed to adequately 
preserve the issue, that failure constituted ineffective assistance. 
A. The State presented expert testimony, argument, and jury instructions that 
misstated the law. 
The securities fraud statute makes it “unlawful for any person, in connection with 
the []sale… of any security… to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading.” Utah Code §61-1-1(2). “‘The plain language of section 61-1-1(2)... makes 
no mention of an affirmative duty to disclose in the absence of a prior[, misleading] 
statement.’” Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶10. Rather, a defendant has a duty to disclose or 
“not omit” only when (1) a predicate statement was made, (2) the predicate statement was 
misleading, and (3) the omitted statement was material. Id.; Utah Code §61-1-1(2).  
Here, erroneous expert testimony, prosecutorial argument, and jury instructions 
suggested that the law imposed an affirmative duty to disclose material information—
even in the absence of a prior misleading statement. The misstatements began with 
Lloyd, the State’s securities expert, who gave “legal conclusion[s]” that were “wrong.” 
Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607. Lloyd testified, for instance, that “federal and state securities 
laws operate under the presumption that a seller of securities has an obligation to make 
disclosure[s] so that a purchaser can assess” her purchase. R.4826; Addendum E; see also 
R.5468-69 (Lloyd referencing “the fundamental obligations that are established under 
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law with respect to disclosure”); accord R.4827-38, 4843, 5468-69. Later in Lloyd’s 
testimony, he discussed the “obligation not to omit material information… [and] engage 
in deceit. Those… are established by statute.” R.4844.  
Then in closing, the prosecutor made further misstatements, arguing that “the 
securities industry and the law, it all requires the seller to be up front, to make full 
disclosures about information that the average reasonable investor would want to know. 
And that's contained in the jury instructions.” R.5611; Addendum F. Thus, Lloyd and the 
prosecutor incorrectly suggested that the law imposed an affirmative duty to disclose or 
“not[] omit” material information. 
Further, the State-proposed Instruction 47 said that  
…Even if the Defendant(s) had an honest belief that an event would 
occur in the future or made a good faith effort to bring about the future 
event, he is still not permitted to make a willful misrepresentation or 
omission of a material fact. 
Therefore, to the extent that there exists any such belief that the plan 
will succeed, that belief does not constitute a defense to the crimes alleged 
if you find that the defendant has engage in willful material misstatements 
or omissions. 
R.1419; Addendum B. 
Like Lloyd and the prosecutor, Instruction 47 erroneously told jurors that a 
defendant is “not permitted to make[] willful… omission[s] of[] material fact.” Id. The 
instruction then went further, incorrectly stating that a finding of “willful material… 
omissions” meant that it did not matter if Buttars believed what he said about future 
events—“that belief did not constitute a defense.” Id. But such a “belief d[id] not 
constitute a defense” only if Buttars willfully violated the securities fraud statute by 
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misstating or omitting material facts necessary to correct a misleading predicate 
statement. Utah Code §61-1-1(2). Indeed, if Buttars genuinely believed in his forward-
looking statements, that could be a defense to the crimes—specifically, to the allegation 
that Buttars uttered misstatements. E.g., SEC v. Ustian, 229 F.Supp. 3d 739 (N.D Ill. 
2017) (“future hopes are generally not actionable if they are based on a genuine belief”); 
accord Greenberg v. Crossroads, 364 F.3d 657, 670 (5th Cir. 2004). The instruction, 
therefore, misstated the law and effect of violating a duty to disclose. 
In short, the legal misstatements of Lloyd, the prosecutor, and Instruction 47 
suggested that the law imposed an affirmative duty to disclose material information—a 
violation of which rendered a defendant’s genuine beliefs in his statements “not [] a 
defense.” In turn, the misstatements expanded the conduct criminalized by the securities 
fraud statute, thereby reducing the State’s burden of proof. Moreover, these 
misstatements prejudiced Buttars. Infra pp.65-66. 
B. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance to the extent counsel did not 
adequately preserve this issue. 
Counsel objected to Instruction 47, but did not object to the misstatements of 
Lloyd or the prosecutor. R.4124-26. The court ruled that the instruction was 
“appropriate” and gave it over defense counsel’s objection. Id. Buttars preserved an 
objection to Instruction 47 because the trial court had the opportunity to rule—and did in 
fact rule—on the instruction’s propriety. See Fort Pierce Indus. Park v. Shakespeare, 
2016 UT 28,¶13; Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68,¶12. 
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This Court may review the misstatements of Lloyd and the prosecutor for 
ineffective assistance. Supra p.45 (setting forth ineffective assistance test).  Likewise, if 
this Court believes that counsel’s objection to Instruction 47 did not preserve the issue, 
the failure to properly preserve the issue constituted ineffective assistance. State v. 
Larrabee, 2013 UT 70,¶26 (performance deficient because, by failing to object, counsel 
“failed to preserve the issue”). 
First, counsel performed deficiently by failing to adequately object to the 
misstatements. As shown, Lloyd, the prosecutor, and Instruction 47 misstated the law, 
supra §III.A; thus, a proper objection to these misstatements would have been well-taken. 
Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶10; see Grunwald, 2018 UT App 46,¶42. Moreover, there 
“was no conceivable tactical benefit” for counsel to allow expert testimony, argument, 
and instructions that departed from “the narrow way in which Utah courts have 
interpreted the applicable [securities] statute.” State v. Lewis, 2014 UT App 241,¶13; see 
Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶¶6-14; Johnson, 2009 UT App 382,¶42. Indeed, the 
misstatements suggested that the law prohibited conduct that was not criminal, thereby 
understating the State’s burden of proof. Supra §III.A There is no conceivable tactical 
basis for suggesting to the jury that the State’s burden was lower than it actually was. 
Grunwald, 2018 UT App 46,¶42.   
Likewise, with respect to Instruction 47, the record suggests that counsel’s goal 
was to preserve the issue for appeal and prevent the instruction from going to the jury. 
R.4124-26. Failing to lodge a specific objection on the record was inconsistent with these 
goals. Id. This suggests that counsel’s failure to properly object was not strategy, but an 
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oversight. Id; State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688, 691-92 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) (counsel 
performed deficiently when he “overlooked” the statutory presumption by failing to 
check the pocket-part). Accordingly, counsel performed deficiently by failing to 
adequately object to the misstatements of Lloyd, the prosecutor, and Instruction 47. 
Second, these misstatements prejudiced Buttars, both individually and 
cumulatively. The misstatements negatively impacted the elements of securities fraud, 
supra §III.A, which in turn, negatively impacted the pattern count as well. R.1411, 1425-
26 (instructions telling jurors that the securities fraud counts were “unlawful” acts upon 
which the pattern count could rest). R.1411, 1425-26.  
Absent the misstatements, there was evidence from which jurors could have 
concluded that Buttars was innocent because he believed all that he said, supra pp.30-31; 
was unaware of the utterance of any prior misleading predicate statements, supra pp.29-
30; and/or he did not misuse investor funds. Supra pp.47-48. But the misstatements told 
jurors that none of this mattered if they found that Buttars willfully omitted material 
facts—facts that he allegedly had a statutory obligation to disclose. R.1419, 4844, 5611.  
True, the elements instructions correctly stated the actus reus for securities fraud. 
E.g., R.1409. But the jury was not given a way to reconcile the elements instructions with 
Instruction 47, which stated that Buttars was “not permitted to make a willful… 
omission[s] of[] material fact.” R.1419; Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 322 (1985) 
(“contradict[ory]” language does not absolve an instructional infirmity); accord State v. 
Campos, 2013 UT App 213,¶43. Nor did the elements instruction cure Instruction 47’s 
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assertion that Buttars’s genuine beliefs did not matter if he made “willful… omission[s] 
of[] material fact.”  R.1419. 
Moreover, the notion that Buttars had a duty to disclose was reinforced at all 
stages of the trial. It was reinforced by Lloyd’s expert testimony, e.g., R.4844; Curtis’s 
expert testimony, e.g., R.5227-28, 5423-39; the prosecutor’s argument, R.5611; and in 
the jury instructions. R.1419. Standing alone, each misstatement caused prejudice, which 
was exacerbated—not cured—by additional misstatements. Thus, the misstatements 
individually and cumulatively undermine confidence in the fairness of Buttars’s trial. 
IV.  This Court should grant Buttars a new trial on all counts because the State’s 
experts gave testimony that violated rules 702, 704, and 403. 
“In general, the admissibility and limits of expert testimony are governed by rules 
701 through 704.” Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361. Rule 702 provides that “a witness who is 
qualified as an expert… may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Utah R. Evid. 702; Addendum I. 
“Under rule 702, the question that must be posed prior to the admission of any expert 
evidence is whether, ‘on balance, the evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact.’” 
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361. “In determining ‘helpfulness,’ the []court must first decide 
whether the subject is within the knowledge or experience of the average individual.” Id.  
Another “integral element of a rule 702 determination to admit expert evidence is 
a balancing of the probativeness of the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice.” 
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Id. at 1363 n.12. “This balancing mimics that under rule 403 and is necessary to a 
determination of ‘helpfulness.’” Id.; Utah R. Evid. 403.  
Under rule 704, “[a]n opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an 
ultimate issue.” Utah R. Evid. 704(a); Addendum I. But there “are limits on an expert’s 
license to testify as to the legal meaning of a statute.” State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 
382,¶37 n.14. Moreover, “opinions that ‘“tell the jury what result to reach”’ or ‘“give 
legal conclusions”’ [are] impermissible.” Davis, 2007 UT App 13,¶15. 
 For instance, in State v. Tenney, it was plain error to allow the experts to testify 
“that the buy-back agreements were securities,” “that certain information was material,” 
and “that failure to disclose certain enumerated information would be a material 
omission.” Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Similarly, in Stringham, it 
was improper for a prosecutor to present a hypothetical “consisting of the exact actions of 
which defendant was accused” and ask the expert to opine on “whether these actions 
were illegal.” Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607, 607 n.15, 611. Conversely, in Larsen, the use 
of the term “material” was not “an inadmissible legal conclusion” because the expert did 
not use the term in its legal sense. Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361-63. Nevertheless, an 
objection under rule 403—which allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence when “its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of… unfair prejudice,” Utah R. 
Evid. 403; Addendum I—“might  have merited serious consideration.” Larsen, 865 P.2d 
at 1363 n.12. 
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Here, Lloyd’s testimony violated Rules 702 and 704. Infra §III.A. Curtis also gave 
improper testimony that violated rules 702, 704, and 403. Infra §III.B. Moreover, 
admission of this testimony was prejudicial. Infra §III.C. 
A. Lloyd’s testimony violated rules 702 and 704. 
In addition to erroneously telling jurors that defendants have a statutory 
“obligation not to omit material information,” R.4844; supra §III.A, Lloyd violated rules 
702 and 704 when he used the legal term “material” and provided case-specific examples 
of material information. See Addendum E (Lloyd’s testimony). 
Unlike in Larsen, Lloyd did not use the term “material” in its non-legal sense; 
rather, as in Tenney, he used it in its legal sense. Compare Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756; with 
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361-63. Specifically Lloyd testified that the definition of “material 
information would be [] information that’s important to an investor making a decision.” 
R.4838; see also R.4830. Thus, the testimony was inadmissible because it “state[d] legal 
conclusions.” Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756.  
Moreover, Lloyd’s examples of material information mirrored the State’s 
allegations. R.4838-39. Lloyd said that “material information” “would include” (1) 
“information about the management” including “who is running this enterprise, what’s 
their background, what’s their experience, have the ever been involved in… inappropriate 
activity.” R.4838. He also listed that it could involve (2) “financial information about the 
enterprise” including whether the “financial assets are sufficient to conduct operations”; 
(3) “what are the risks of the business”; and (4) information about “the underlying assets 
of the business.” R.4838-39. As in Stringham, Lloyd’s examples mirrored the 
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information the State faulted Buttars for not disclosing. Compare Stringham, 957 P.2d at 
607, 611. 
The trial court appeared to determine that Lloyd could give a definition and 
examples of material information provided the testimony comported with Moore, 2015 
UT App 112. R.4836-37. But as counsel pointed out, the portion of Moore discussing 
expert testimony was “not a majority” opinion. R.4837; Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶27 & 
n.4. And even if it was, Lloyd’s testimony ran afoul of Moore by offering certain 
examples that “explicitly mirror[ed] the State's allegations.” 2015 UT App 112,¶27. 
Moreover, this case is distinguishable from Chapman, where the expert merely 
gave “some examples” of information he believed was important “[f]or a purchaser… to 
make an intelligent investment decision.” 2014 UT App 255,¶21. Here, by contrast, 
Lloyd gave a legal definition “material” that was immediately followed by a list of 
information that “would” and could be “material.” R.4838-39. 
Nor did the court adequately consider whether the opinion testimony helped 
jurors. As counsel argued, the materiality question was “squarely within the layman’s 
understanding.” R.4827. It is well within the experience of jurors to know the type of 
information that would likely influence a reasonable investor. Chapman, 2014 UT App 
255,¶32 (Pearce, concurring). This is particularly true in Buttars’s case, which involved a 
start-up company with investments made by lay-individuals much like the jurors 
themselves. Lloyd’s testimony evidences the lack of complexity. Id. Indeed, Lloyd 
“simply listed categories of information,” failing “to explain why such information would 
be important to an investor.” Id.; R.4838-39.  Lloyd may not have explained his 
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conclusions “because they needed no explanation.”  Id.¶33. Under these circumstances, 
Lloyd’s opinion testimony was not helpful to the jury. 
Thus, the testimony was inadmissible under rules 702 and 704 because it “state[d] 
legal conclusions,” Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756; it gave “an opinion as to whether [actions 
like Buttars’s] actions were illegal,” Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607-08; and it did not help 
jurors. Chapman, 2014 UT App 255,¶33 (Pearce, concurring). 
B. Curtis’s testimony violated rules 702, 704, and 403. 
Curtis gave unhelpful and prejudicial testimony that stated legal conclusions and 
opined on the legality of Buttars’s conduct. Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756; Stringham, 957 P.2d 
at 607-08. Specifically, Curtis testified: 
Prosecutor: You indicated that you have particular experience 
investigating and analyzing records of companies or individuals alleged to 
have engaged in fraud, deceit, or theft? Is that correct? 
Curtis: Yes. That's right. 
Prosecutor: In your experience, and based on your practice, are there 
certain characteristics that you look for in analyzing a business or an 
individual to determine fraud, deceit, or theft? 
Curtis: Yes. 
Prosecutor: Can you briefly explain what those characteristics are in 
general? 
Curtis:…As it relates to investment fraud, there would be things like… 
financial statement misrepresentations, or misrepresentations of how the 
money's being used, or failure to disclose material information, or that 
could be omissions. So, if the party has knowledge of material information 
and does not disclose that to investors, that's important. Disregard for 
corporate formalities. That's where corporations--business and personal 
could be commingled and confused…. A business being dependent on 
investor money. Investor money not being used for the stated purpose that's 
stated to investors, it's used for other purposes or unauthorized purposes…. 
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Prosecutor: After reviewing the financial records associated with this case, 
and after listening to the testimony of this trial, based on generally accepted 
accounting practices, do you… see any of these characteristics present in 
this case? 
Curtis: Yes. 
Prosecutor: And which ones, in your opinion? 
Curtis: Right. I see characteristics of misrepresentations and omissions, of 
investor money not being used for the stated purpose, of inadequate 
capitalization or lack of capital to operate the business. Those are the main 
ones that come to mind. And dependence on investor money, obviously. 
R.5227-28; Addendum D. 
This testimony was improper. First, Curtis incorporated the legal terms “fraud, 
deceit, or theft” into his conclusion testimony. Utah Code §§61-1-1(2)-(3). The 
prosecutor framed his question in terms of those “alleged to have engaged in fraud, 
deceit, or theft.” R.5227-28 (emphasis added). From this, it is evident that the terms 
“fraud, deceit, or theft” were being used in reference to the statutory crimes that Buttars 
was “alleged to have engaged in.” Id. Thus, as in Tenney, the terms were used in their 
legal sense. Compare Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756; with Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361-63.  
Curtis further offered his legal interpretation of these terms by providing case-
specific examples of “characteristics” used “to determine” fraud, deceit, or theft. R.5227-
28. Most—if not all—of the examples closely mirrored the allegations. E.g., R.5227-28 
(“misrepresentations of how… money's being used”). Curtis then opined that these 
“characteristics” were present in Buttars’s case. Id. In effect, the testimony told jurors 
that there were characteristics of legal fraud, deceit, and theft in Buttars’s case. While the 
testimony fell short of opining that Buttars was guilty of fraud, saying that there are 
“characteristics” of fraud implies the presence of at least some of the legal elements of 
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fraud. Id. Indeed, “characteristic” is a synonym of “element.”8 And Curtis testified he 
observed “omissions” and “misrepresentations”—both of which constitute elements of 
securities fraud. Id. Utah Code §61-1-1(2).  
The court reasoned the testimony was appropriate provided Curtis did not testify 
to the requirements of “Utah law.” R.5223-24; Addendum D. But jurors would have 
known that Curtis was drawing conclusions about legal fraud/deceit even if without an 
explicit reference to “Utah law.” As explained, the terms “fraud, deceit, and theft” were 
used in reference to the statutory crimes Buttars was “alleged to have engaged in.” 
R.5227-28. Moreover, Curtis offered no explanation regarding an alternative meaning of 
the terms. Id. Even Larsen, which the prosecution used to support its arguments, frowned 
upon testimony drawing upon statutory language. Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361-63 & n.3. 
The court, therefore, was incorrect.  
But even if testimony passes muster provided no reference to “Utah law” is made, 
the court did not fully consider the testimony’s helpfulness or admissibility under rule 
403. The testimony’s probative value was minimal. Indeed, Curtis had already testified 
about troubling charges and “red flags” in Buttars’s financials. R.5199, 5204, 5207, 
5180-82, 5185, 5195, 5199-5200. There was little need for further conclusion 






deceit. The sequencing of the prosecutor’s questions and the use of statutory terms 
supported this belief. R.5227-28.  Moreover, Curtis’s testimony tended to “‘blur the 
separate and distinct responsibilities of the judge, jury, and witness,’” and created a 
danger that the jurors might “‘turn to [Curtis] rather than the judge for guidance on the… 
law.’” Id.; Johnson, 2009 UT App 382,¶37 n.14. Thus, this Court should reverse because 
Curtis’s testimony would not help the trier of fact, as required by rule 702; was unduly 
prejudicial under rule 403; and stated legal conclusions in violation of rules 702 and 704. 
C. Prejudice. 
An appellate court must “‘overturn a jury verdict for the admission of improper 
evidence’” whenever the evidence reasonably affected “‘the likelihood of a different 
verdict.’” State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184,¶34. In this case, there was a reasonable 
probability of a different result but for Lloyd and/or Curtis’s improper expert testimony. 
Considered individually and cumulatively, Lloyd and/or Curtis’s testimony 
negatively impacted the elements of securities fraud. See Utah Code §§61-1-1(2)-(3), 61-
1-21. Because the testimony affected the securities fraud charges, this Court should 
reverse on the pattern count as well. R.1411, 1425-26; supra p.28. 
Lloyd and Curtis told jurors what result to reach, used statutory terms that 
constituted elements of the offense, and opined that those elements or “characteristics” 
were present in Buttars’s case. Supra §IV.A-B. Given the complexity of securities law, 
Lloyd and Curtis’s conclusions would have been especially persuasive. See Larsen, 865 
P.2d at 1361. “[T]here is a danger” that jurors relied on the experts’ expertise rather than 
studying the instructions and reaching their own conclusions. Davis, 2007 UT App 
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13,¶15. There is also a danger that jurors deferred to Lloyd and Curtis’s expertise even if 
they were inclined to believe differently. See Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361. 
Absent Lloyd and/or Curtis’s testimony, the jury had reason to doubt that Buttars 
was guilty of securities fraud. There was evidence from which the jury could have 
concluded that Buttars was innocent because: (1) no misleading predicate statements 
were uttered, or if they were uttered, Buttars was unaware of them, see supra pp.29-30; 
(2) Buttars believed all that he said, see supra pp.30-31; and (3) Buttars did not engage in 
a pattern of misusing investor funds. See supra pp.47-48. Absent Lloyd’s testimony, a 
jury could also doubt the materiality of Lloyd’s list of allegedly material information. For 
instance, a jury could doubt the importance of management’s prior, “inappropriate 
activity” where the activity had no bearing on the success of the company. R.4848. 
Moreover, Curtis and/or Lloyd’s testimony “could easily have misled the jury” 
into convicting based on non-criminal conduct. Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607-08. Through 
their use of statutory terminology, Curtis and Lloyd erroneously led jurors to believe 
that—notwithstanding the utterance of a prior misleading statement—the fraud statute 
condemned the “failure to disclose” the broad list of “material” information identified by 
Lloyd. R.4838-39, 5227-28; see R.5227-28 (Curtis identifying the “failure to disclose 
material information, or… omissions” as a characteristic of “fraud” and identifying 
“omissions” as one of the characteristics of “fraud” that he observed in Buttars’s case).  
From this, the jury could have believed, for instance, that Buttars was guilty 
simply because he did not disclose otherwise doubtfully relevant/material information 
about late payments on his personal credit card. R.4838-39 (Lloyd defining material to 
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broadly include “information about the management” of the company). Curtis’s 
testimony further supported such a belief, stating that Buttars’s personal state of financial 
distress “would be a significant disclosure to investors.” R.5423-39; St.Exs.39-40. 
Moreover, as explained, the instructions reinforced rather than corrected this erroneous 
impression. Supra pp.65-66. 
Considered individually and cumulatively, it is reasonably likely that Buttars 
would have enjoyed a more favorable result but for the improper expert testimony. 
V.  Cumulative error requires reversal. 
 Considering “‘all the identified errors’” addressed above, “‘as well as any other 
errors [this Court] assume[s] may have occurred,’” this Court should reverse because 
“‘“the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [] confidence… that a fair trial 
was had.”’” State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,¶25. 
Here, the improper expert testimony, prosecutorial argument, and instructions 
worked to increase the likelihood that the jury convicted based on non-criminal conduct. 
Supra §§II-IV. Curtis and Lloyd’s expert testimony, Instruction 47, and the prosecutor’s 
argument allowed jurors to convict Buttars for violating an affirmative duty to disclose—
a duty that does not exist under the securities fraud statute. Supra §III-IV. Meanwhile, 
Instruction 42 provided an incorrect definition of willfulness that expanded the conduct 
criminalized by the securities fraud statute. Supra §II. And Instruction 47 similarly 
impacted the mental state requirement by incorrectly describing a scenario where 
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        Ms. Tangaro enters objections and arguments for objections of PSR into the record. 
        
        Mr. Taylor enters arguments in favor of PSR recommendations into the record. 
        
        The Court enters sentence.
        
        The Court orders the defendant to pay full restitution on all counts.  The State will 
        file an order of restitution with the Court.                                           
 
        SENTENCE PRISON                                                                        
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        COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.                                                    
        
        To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff:  The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
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        SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE                                            
        Commitment and charges to run concurrent to any other commitment.                      
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        Defendant is taken forthwith to begin serving commitment.  Any and all restitution 
        amounts to be paid through the Board of Pardons.                                       
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
 
        




























































Q. Is that based on what you determined were --
appeared to be investor payments?
A. Yes.
Q. And looking at this, and taking into account
all the other information you've heard in this case, have
you attended the trial throughout its beginning
yesterday?
A. Yes.
Q. Or from its beginning? Taking into account
-- and let me also ask, have you reviewed any other
documents in your preparation for performing these
analyses and testifying?
A. Yes, I've received some -- reviewed some of
the case file from the investigation that the state
performed. I've participated in a couple of interviews
with some of the -- the management of the company, and
yeah, I heard the evidence and the testimony today and
yesterday.
MR. TAYLOR: Let me have a moment, Your Honor.
Q. So, Mr. Curtis, you've indicated that you
have particular experience investigating and analyzing
records of companies and individuals -- of companies and
individuals alleged to have engaged in fraud, theft,





























Q. So, in your experience, are there certain
characteristics that you look for? And I -- you may have
talked about some of these, but are there certain
characteristics that you look for in analyzing a business
or an individual to determine fraud, or theft, or deceit?
MR. CUMMINGS: Your Honor, may we approach?
THE COURT: Yes.
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows).
MR. CUMMINGS: This is going to be the same, Your
Honor. Same issue as Mr. Lloyd. Whether the
characteristics track closely to this case, and
especially after he laid out all the evidence, and then
he asked what characteristics, he's going to go over what
the characteristics were as to what the evidence just
said. I think that's highly prejudicial, and also for
the jury.
MR. TAYLOR: He's giving his opinion as to what
characteristics of financial fraud are. I mean, that's
-- as an expert, he's qualified to do that.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. CUMMINGS: I was going to say, if you go back
to the Moore case, though, what concerned at least one
judge on the Court of Appeals there, was that the
characteristics track too closely to the case.




























MR. CUMMINGS: Well, it was the -- it was the
opinion of the Court that wasn't joined by the two other
judges.
THE COURT: Okay. So --
MR. CUMMINGS: So --
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. TAYLOR: And I'm not asking him to talk -- I'm
asking him in general right now.
THE COURT: Mm-hmm.
MR. TAYLOR: And if I recall --
THE COURT: Yeah. The case law says you can ask
generally, but you can't tie it specifically to the case.
It's part of why I changed my mind on the objection to
the material omission because it seemed to me that the
case law says that you can't tie it to the case, you
can't say that, pursuant to Utah law, these are the
things --
MR. TAYLOR: Right.
THE COURT: But a witness can testify generally --
an expert witness can testify generally as to things he
looks for, or, you know, things of that nature, as long
as it's not tied to this case. So, if you're going to
ask generally what characteristics somebody looks for in
the -- in the industry, and so forth, I think that was




























remember if it's the Davis case, or Judge Greeley had
said was okay. But you cannot say, based on my review in
this case, here is what I saw.
MR. CUMMINGS: And that's where that question was
going. Because he said, you sat through all the
testimony, you've heard all the evidence, we just
reviewed all the bank records. Generally, what do you
look for?
THE COURT: Mm-hmm.
MR. CUMMINGS: It's tied directly to the case.
MR. TAYLOR: I can rephrase that question. I can
say, based on your experience, in your profession in
general, what are -- what are characteristics of
financial fraud?
THE COURT: Okay. Well, you need to make sure that
the witness does not say, "well, in this case here's what
I saw.".
MR. TAYLOR: Yeah.
THE COURT: He can testify generally in the
industry the things that are looked for, or that somebody
looks for in his position, when he's analyzing, you know,
in general cases. He can testify about that. But he
can't say," well, in this case, here's what I saw."
MR. CUMMINGS: I would still like to lodge an




























examination, there's no way to have this untethered from
the case, after he's laid out all the evidence --
THE COURT: Well, he can --
MR. CUMMINGS: -- gone through all the exhibits,
so...
THE COURT: -- he can testify about things that
were red flags to him.
MR. CUMMINGS: Sure.
THE COURT: That's what he's testified to --
MR. CUMMINGS: Sure. And he -- and he has.
THE COURT: --thus far.
MR. CUMMINGS: But now on a summation saying, what
do you look for in fraud, I -- I, just at this point, I
would like to lodge the objection.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CUMMINGS: You can, of course, overrule it,
but --
THE COURT: So -- so, your objection is sustained
as to anything -- if the intent was to get him to go
through this case and say, what's fraudulent in this
case.
MR. TAYLOR: Well, he can opine as to whether there
are characteristics of financial fraud in this case. I
mean, he's allowed to do that under Rule 704. His





























THE COURT: So, this is the part of the law that I
think is sometimes confusing to lawyers, and I don't
profess to be the person that knows this, but as a
general proposition, a witness -- and I think Moore and
Chapman say that an expert witness, in certain
circumstances, can give their opinion about the ultimate
issue in a case. But there are some situations where
they can't.
And if I'm going to err on the side of not creating
an issue for appeal, it would be, you get where you want
to go by having the witness testify about what
characteristics of fraud that he looks for generally,
rather than having him say, you know, here's what I saw
was fraud in this case.
MR. TAYLOR: Well, it -- in that case, Your Honor,
what I'll do is I'll ask him, in general, based on his
practice and his knowledge of --
THE COURT: Right.
MR. TAYLOR: -- of forensic accounting --
THE COURT: Mm-hmm.
MR. TAYLOR: -- what are some characteristics of
financial fraud? And then I guess the Court's -- under





























THE COURT: Well, and then you can argue it. You
can argue it to the jury. Right? But I -- is there any
case law that identifies what -- that says a witness --
an expert witness in this situation can say, well, here's
the fraudulent things that I saw in this case?
MR. TAYLOR: If I could have a second, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Okay.
(Inaudible conversation).
MR. TAYLOR: Judge, our understanding of case law
is that this is territory we can get into, and I would
cite the Larsen decision from 1993. Now, that was a case
where a securities expert testified, and I believe the
Utah Supreme Court held that the securities expert could
opine as to whether the -- the alleged material --
omissions were material -- would be material or important
to the average investor.
And in addition to that, the Chapman case, we
believe, is actually supportive of us, and if the -- I
don't mean to ask for a recess, but if the Court wanted
to review that, I believe that there's a part of that
decision --
THE COURT: There is.
MR. TAYLOR: Well, I believe that there's a part of
that decision which says that --




























let's give the jury a recess and we can talk about this--
MR. TAYLOR: Okay.
THE COURT: -- at length. Okay?
MR. TAYLOR: Okay.
(End of sidebar).
THE COURT: Members of the jury, we're going to
take about a five or 10-minute recess. Please do not
talk about the case. We just need the time to put some
things on the record.
Raine?
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom).
THE COURT: Please be seated. All members of the
jury have now left the courtroom.
The discussion regarding the question asked of Mr.
Curtis is -- at sidebar is on the record, and I asked the
jury to step outside so that we can talk about this more
thoroughly rather than on the record. The state has
identified State V. Larsen and State v. Chapman. And let
me read this part of Chapman which, again, is what I had
indicated to the parties at sidebar.
There are certain things that, under State v.
Chapman, an expert witness can testify about. And in
fact, State v. Chapman says, quote, an expert witness may
testify in the form of an opinion, and can opine on an




























otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence.
And then it -- well, and the next -- and then it
cites Rule 704. And then it goes on and says, 'an
opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an
ultimate issue. An expert witness exceeds the scope of
permissible testimony when the witness's legal
conclusions blur the separate and distinct
responsibilities of the judge, jury, and witness, or
there is a danger that the juror may turn to the
witness's legal conclusion rather than judge for guidance
on the applicable law.'
So, and I'll read the next sentence, because I
think it demonstrates why we are struggling with this
issue.
The case says, 'no bright line separates
permissible ultimate issue testimony under Rule 704, and
impermissible overbroad legal responses a witness may
give during questioning, and the trial court has wide
discretion in determining the admissibility of expert
testimony.'
So, as I indicated to counsel at sidebar, there is
no complete exclusion of an expert witness from
testifying or giving an opinion, or opining on the -- on
an ultimate issue at trial. And that's what the case law




























where I think the -- the expert witness can overstep
their bounds and takes away the determination from the
jury as to the ultimate issue at hand. And if that's the
case, or when that is the case, the trial court should
not allow the witness to give their opinion about certain
things. If it appears that that is going to take away
from the jury, or the finder of fact, their
responsibility of making the ultimate determinations in
this case.
Okay. So, the objection has been made by Mr.
Cummings. Let me hear, Mr. Taylor, what your position
is, and exactly what question, and what you are seeking
from the witness, and then I'll hear from Mr. Cummings
and make a ruling.
MR. TAYLOR: First, the question that I'm asking
Mr. Curtis is, in his experience, if there are certain
characteristics that he looks for in analyzing a business
or an individual to determine fraud, deceit, or theft.
And I could rephrase that to make it clear that I'm
asking based on his experience, his knowledge, and -- as
a forensic accountant, to explain what those
characteristics are. I believe he would give off a list
of certain characteristics. For example, business
activity is dependant on outside investor money --




























enterprise lacks profits sufficient to provide the
promised returns to investors, high rates of return
relative to the promoted investment risk, business
experiences -- that the business experiences increasing
insolvency, and preferential treatment to certain
investors, disregard to corporate formalities. Those are
characteristics of financial fraud that he would outline
or list.
And then I would ask him, after reviewing the
financial records associated with this case, and
listening to the testimony at trial -- and perhaps I
should've asked this later -- but based on generally
accepted accounting practices, do you see any of these
characteristics present in this case? And I would ask
him to identify any such characteristics that he -- that
he has observed in this case. And I would ask him if he
had an opinion as to whether the defendants engaged in
the course of business which operated as a fraud, deceit,
or theft.
I would ask him, what is your opinion? And I
believe that he would testify that he does see what
appear to be the characteristics of financial fraud, and






























MR. CUMMINGS: I think the witness has already
testified to most of that. He's used the term red flag
multiple times. He's said that certain charges are
troubling. And so, he's given an expert opinion as to
what the summaries elicit, what the charges -- what he
believes the charges reflect.
And in Moore, I think this is important, as the
Court has said, an expert witness can tie their opinion
-- can't tie their opinion to law -- to the law -- to
Utah law, but can embrace an ultimate conclusion, but at
the end of this paragraph 22, the court says, 'other
jurisdictions have determined that expert witness
testimony that encompasses an ultimate issue is generally
admissible when it alludes to an inference that the trier
of facts should make, or uses a term that has both a lay
factual meaning and a legal meaning, and it's clear that
the witness is using only the factual term.
And in here, the -- it's the legal meaning of
fraud. This is indicia of accounting fraud, this is
indicia of an enterprise running in a fraudulent manner.
I believe that the accounting expert, Mr. Curtis, has
laid out all the information, and the jury needs to draw






























MR. TAYLOR: And --
MR. CUMMINGS: And I would also say it's
prejudicial under 403 considering the sequencing of the
questions and where we're at in questioning.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. TAYLOR: If I may, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. TAYLOR: My recollection of the Moore opinion
is that the witness cannot tie his opinion to the
requirements of law. In Moore, we're talking about
securities fraud, and, of course, there's a lot of gray
area when it comes to what the law is -- Utah law, and
what the securities statutes say.
Here, we're not talking about the law. We're
talking about generally accepted accounting principles.
So, there's that distinction.
And also, again, I'm not asking him to -- to say,
this is fraud, it's just that these are characteristics
of fraud which I see, and that's the distinction there.
And finally, the Chapman decision, in Chapman, the
court recognized that where the expert does not
specifically testify that the defendant was guilty, or
that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the legal
standard, I believe the court upheld the expert testimony




























securities expert, I believe.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. TAYLOR: So, there are those distinctions.
THE COURT: Anything further?
MR. CUMMINGS: I did, and I just totally lost my
train of thought. Hold on, one moment.
I don't think my -- I would have an objection if
Mr. Curtis testified that certain accounting practices
here, as evidenced by the banking records, violated GAAP,
or the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. But
it's the -- it's the connection of, do these bank records
show fraud? Are these -- you know, what you have
reviewed here, is this a fraudulent scheme? And to me,
there's an important difference between those two --
between those two lines of questioning.
THE COURT: Okay. Anything further?
So, I'm going to allow the testimony to go through
as long as there is no mention of, under Utah law, or
under the laws of the State of Utah, or federal law, and
so forth. The witness has already testified that he -- I
mean, there -- I'm assuming -- and I think I'm correct --
that there are investigations in the industry looking for
fraud, or fraudulent conduct, that may not necessarily
rise to the level of a criminal offense, that there --




























questioning is tied to the witness's experience as a
fraud investigator, his experience in the industry, what
the industry looks like, what the industry looks for, and
so forth, I -- the testimony can come in. Particularly
because testimony related to, what are characteristics of
fraud, are not things that are within the kin or the
understanding normally of a layperson, it's information
that normally would come from an expert, defining what
the industry believes are things that are looked for,
characteristics, and so forth.
It's part of the reason that I changed my mind and
allowed the testimony regarding what the industry
considers is material information and so forth during the
testimony of Mr. Lloyd. So again, I think so long as the
questioning and the answers do not touch on, you know,
the ultimate question under Utah law, or under the
statutes and so forth, as to what is fraudulent, what is
securities fraud, and so forth. The witness can testify
about his understanding, what is the accepted standard
and characteristics in the industry, and so forth.
Any clarification needed?
Any objection if -- well, Mr. Curtis is here on the
witness stand, and I think he's heard the Court's ruling,
but I -- as I've indicated in the past, if counsel




























an issue, unless there's an objection, I would be fine if
leading questions are used.
Mr. Cummings?
MR. CUMMINGS: I would just like to put on the
record that, as with Mr. Lloyd, the initial round of
questions with Mr. Lloyd, I don't believe that it's
helpful to the trier of fact. And I understand the
Court's ruling, we'd just like the record clear that part
of our objection is also on that aspect.
THE COURT: Yeah. And I looked at the Chapman
case, I think Chapman and Moore -- or one or the other,
and the Court of Appeals in one or both of those cases
determined that when the witness -- and I think it was
Mr. Lloyd, actually, testified -- he testified generally
enough, or sufficiently general, did not say that under
the laws of the State of Utah this was the case, and my
recollection of the question asked by Mr. Palumbo was,
according to the industry, or in the industry, yada,
yada, yada.
And the case law seemed to me to say that there's
not an absolute prohibition against an expert testifying
about what a material omission, or what material
information is. It depends on the case. And I think in
this case, the -- the conduct and the things -- the




























things that I don't think the ordinary citizen, ordinary
juror, would understand unless they have some specialized
knowledge. And so, it was necessary for Mr. Lloyd to
give that information during his testimony. Okay.
Shall we bring the jury in? Raine?
While Raine is doing that, let me also indicate the
following -- in case I forget, will one of you remind me?
All the jurors have to leave their copies of the exhibit
here. They cannot take them home. But I don't want to
forget that. In other words, I don't want somebody
taking it home and looking at it tonight. They can look
at them here and review them, and then when they're done,
they leave everything, and they go home, and come back,
and so forth. I think that's the way it should be done,
because we don't let them take any exhibits home.
(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom).
THE COURT: All members of the jury are now in the
courtroom, all counsel are present, and the defendant is
present.
Mr. Taylor?
MR. TAYLOR: Thank you.
THE COURT: And Mr. Curtis resumes the witness
stand, he's previously been sworn in.
Q. (BY MR. TAYLOR) Mr. Curtis, a couple more




























ask you this. You indicated that you have particular
experience investigating and analyzing records of
companies or individuals alleged to have engaged in
fraud, deceit, or theft? Is that correct?
A. Yes. That's right.
Q. In your experience, and based on your
practice, are there certain characteristics that you look
for in analyzing a business or an individual to determine
fraud, deceit, or theft?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you briefly explain what those
characteristics are in general?
A. Generally, yeah. As it relates to investment
fraud, there would be things like misrepresentations,
financial -- that could be financial statement
misrepresentations, or misrepresentations of how the
money's being used, or failure to disclose material
information, or that could be omissions.
So, if the party has knowledge of material
information and does not disclose that to investors,
that's important. Disregard for corporate formalities.
That's where corporations -- business and personal could
be commingled and confused, that could be part of that,
or disregarded in that way. A business being dependent




























stated purpose that's stated to investors, it's used for
other purposes or unauthorized purposes. Those are --
those are some of the main characteristics we look at.
Q. Maybe you touched on this, but what about the
business enterprise lacking profits sufficient to provide
the promised returns to investors?
A. Yes. And also, you know, sometimes
businesses are insolvent, that means their liabilities
exceed their assets, or they become further insolvent as
they continue to operate, or operate with very small
capital, or undercapitalized.
Q. Thank you. After reviewing the financial
records associated with this case, and after listening to
the testimony of this trial, based on generally accepted
accounting practices, do you -- and principles, do you
see any of these characteristics present in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. And which ones, in your opinion?
A. Right. I see characteristics of
misrepresentations and omissions, of investor money not
being used for the stated purpose, of inadequate
capitalization or lack of capital to operate the
business. Those are the main ones that come to mind.
And dependence on investor money, obviously.





























MR. TAYLOR: If I could have a second, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
Q. (BY MR. TAYLOR) Mr. Curtis, what is the
significance of -- or what is the importance of keeping
money where it belongs?
A. I think it has to do with the representations
that are made to -- to those that are owed a duty. For
example, those that put the -- put money into a company
to invest.




Q. Mr. Curtis, my name is Robert Cummings. We
spoke several months ago, I believe, in Ms. Tangaro's
office. I'm the attorney representing Mr. Buttars in
this matter.
You're working for the state today essentially, is
that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And you're being paid to be here, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were hired by the prosecutor to come






























THE COURT: Okay. Would you ask Mr. Wood, if he's
not in the courtroom -- he is here. Mr. Wood, make your
way up --
MR. PALUMBO: I'm sorry, it's Brian Lloyd.
THE COURT: Oh, Lloyd?
MR. PALUMBO: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
Mr. Lloyd, come on up here to the witness stand on
my left, and we will ask you just before you have a seat
to raise your right hand and take the oath from the
clerk.
BRIAN GLEN LLOYD
Having first been duly sworn, testified upon his
oath as follows:
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, sir. Go ahead and
have a seat. That microphone in front of you, this is
obvious, does two things, it records what you say, and
also amplifies what you say, so if you'll speak into
that, that will help the jurors hear what you have to
say, and also make our record clear.
Mr. Palumbo, whenever you're ready.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PALUMBO:





























A. Brian Glen Lloyd.
Q. And Mr. Lloyd, could you describe your
educational background?
A. I have an undergraduate degree in finance
from Brigham Young University and a law degree from
Columbia University.
Q. And you mentioned that you have a law degree.
Are you admitted to practice anywhere?
A. In the state of Utah.
Q. And when were you admitted to practice in the
state of Utah?
A. In 1989.
Q. What's your current occupation?
A. I currently serve as the chief legal officer
of Merit Medical Systems located here in the valley.
Q. And prior to holding that position, what did
you do prior to that?
A. I practiced law in the areas of corporate
governance, securities, and mergers and acquisitions for
about 20 -- 26 years.
Q. And did you have any titles or distinctions
during the time of practicing law?
A. Well, at the time that I left private




























in the firm of Parr Brown Gee and Loveless, a law firm
here in Salt Lake City.
Q. And could you describe some of your duties at
Parr Brown?
A. I represented a number of clients, primarily
in securities, either financing or reporting
transactions, corporate governance, mergers and
acquisitions.
Q. And have you ever been affiliated with any
bar sections related to any area of practice?
A. I have been. I have been a member of the
securities section of the Utah State Bar throughout most
of my career.
Q. And have you ever testified in court about
security matters?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. About how many times?
A. Probably -- actually, in court testimony, six
or eight times.
Q. Okay. And were those civil cases or criminal
cases?
A. They were primarily criminal cases.
Q. Could you give the Court a basic definition
of a security?




























security, in general terms, is that it's an investment.
Q. Can you give some examples of what a security
might be?
A. Sure. It could be the acquisition of stock
in a company, it could be the ownership of a partnership
interest, it could be an ownership interest in a limited
liability company, it could be certain types of notes
that are made for investments are securities, bonds are
securities, options and warrants are all forms of
securities.
Q. And based on your experience in the
securities industry, does a security have to be in
writing?
A. No, it does not.
Q. Based on your experience in the industry, is
there any specific set of laws that exist in the various
states and federally that regulate securities?
A. There are. There are laws both on the
federal level, and then each individual state has adopted
laws which govern the regulation of securities.
Q. And has Utah adopted its own securities laws?
A. It has.
Q. Based on your experience in the securities
industry, could you explain how security differs from




























-- how does a security differ from buying a refrigerator?
A. Well, in the industry relating to securities,
that industry is regulated because a security involves
trust, it involves an -- as I mentioned earlier, an
investment in -- with the expectation of profit.
When you purchase a hard good, a car, a
refrigerator, you have an opportunity to open and close
the doors, and the expression with cars is, you kick the
tires. You can look at it, you can touch it, you can
feel it, and you can assess what that object is, and what
kind of condition it's in, whether it's been treated
well, or whether it's been abused.
When you purchase a security, you're relying on the
representations that are being made to you by the seller
of the security, and it's much more difficult to kick the
tires, so to speak. And so, the federal and state
securities laws operate under the presumption that a
seller of securities has an obligation to make disclosure
so that a purchaser can assess what it is that he or she
may be purchasing.
Q. And you mentioned a minute ago that sellers
of securities may have certain obligations. Could you
describe what some of those obligations are?
A. In general, the obligations in the industry




























misstatements of material facts, not to omit information
that's necessary in order to understand material fact.
Q. And based on your experience in the
securities industry, could you explain how fraud is
defined in the securities industry?
A. Generally, it's -- fraud is considered when
you have a misstatement of material information, or the
omission of material information necessary to address a
misstatement, or a deceit.
Q. And you mentioned the phrase 'material
statements'. Based on your experience in the securities
industry, could you give some examples of what material
statements may entail?
A. That's -- it's information --
MR. CUMMINGS: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Approach.
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows).
MR. CUMMINGS: This is the situation, I believe
that the Chapman court addressed two things, one is
defining what is a material misstatement, the second
thing is providing examples. My concern is that the
examples are going to be too closely related to this
case, and at least one judge in -- was it Chapman, or --
THE COURT: Moore.




























MR. CUMMINGS: Moore, thank you.
MR. PALUMBO: (Inaudible).
MR. CUMMINGS: But it was too prejudicial to give
the examples of the statements. The second thing I would
submit is that in this case, all these statements or
alleged statements and alleged omissions are squarely
within a reasonable jury's mindset. It's not needed. We
don't need expert testimony to say that -- whether a jury
will -- a reasonable investor in a jury's mind will say
what about credit card debt needs to know about the prior
(inaudible) stuff along those lines. It's not complex.
MR. PALUMBO: And Your Honor, I have a copy of the
Moore decision if you would like it for your reference,
but I believe the issue in Moore is that there was a
discussion of material misstatements, and how the
security expert defined them. The issue was that the
expert in that case was opining on what the law said
rather than what the industry dictates. And so, when I
ask, based on your experience in the industry, I'm not
asking the expert to tell me what the law is. I'm asking
him to tell me what his experience in the industry when
he forms his opinion.
MR. CUMMINGS: The distinction with that is the
(inaudible) would still be able to make a conclusion





























MR. PALUMBO: I'm simply asking also for an example
of what the material misstatement might be. I'm not
asking the expert to talk about what's going on in this
case, and to tell the jury that what's happening in this
case is a material distinction.
THE COURT: If the wit -- if the witness says
something that is -- was a material omission in this
case, do you see that as a problem?
MR. PALUMBO: Pardon me?
THE COURT: If the witness says -- gives an example
of a material omitment -- a material omission, and it's
something that was done in this case, do you see the
problem with that?
MR. PALUMBO: No, because I think he could provide
a number of examples, as long as the examples don't
exactly track the facts of this case, and he's not --
MS. TANGARO: And that's what she's asking.
THE COURT: That's what I'm saying.
MR. PALUMBO: But I'm saying, if those are the only
examples he provides, rather than providing a -- you
know, an inclusive list of various types of examples in
other cases that would be material --
THE COURT: Do you anticipate that the witness will




























MR. PALUMBO: Yes. Yeah. But not exclusively.
THE COURT: Mm-hmm.
MS. TANGARO: I don't think that's --
MR. CUMMINGS: That's the concern.
MS. TANGARO: I think that's objectionable
(inaudible).
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going -- I'm going to
sustain the objection for now, but you can ask the
witness to define what the definition is of material
statements, and so forth, but I don't think it would be
appropriate for him to give examples that would include
what was mentioned in this case because then he would be
saying, you know, that's a material omission (inaudible).
MR. PALUMBO: Sure.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PALUMBO: Thank you.
(End of sidebar).
Q. (BY MR. PALUMBO) Mr. Lloyd, based on your
experience in the industry, could you give a working
definition of material misstatement?
A. Well, it would be a misstatement of
information that a reasonable investor would consider
important in making a decision whether to purchase or to
sell a security.




























are you familiar with the term, 'willful'?
A. Yes.
Q. And in the securities industry, what does
that term mean?
A. It's generally understood to mean an
intentional -- in the case, for example, of statements,
an intentional statement.
Q. And based on your experience in the industry,
is a seller required to disclose all material
information?
A. A seller is -- the industry expectation is
that a seller will not misrepresent any material
information or omit to provide material information
that's necessary to correct a misstatement.
Q. With respect to a purchaser of a security, in
the securities industry, does a purchaser of a security
have any obligations?
A. None, other than a contract they may enter
into.
Q. On the part of a purchaser of a security, is
there any legal obligation in the securities industry for
a purchaser to engage in any kind of due diligence or
investigation?





























Q. I'd like to refer now -- I believe earlier
you mentioned some examples of things that are
securities. And I believe you mentioned stocks. Could
you please explain what a stock is?
A. Yes. Stock represents an ownership interest
in a particular type of enterprise called a corporation.
And so, a corporation takes in money from investors or
other purchasers, and in exchange for the proceeds that
it receives, it can issue shares of stock, which
represent the ownership interest in the corporation.
Q. And does acquiring stock come with any rights
or obligations?
A. Well, stock is, in the industry, considered
to be a security. And so, a party which sells shares of
stock is subject to the obligations we've discussed, not
to make material misstatements, and not to omit
information that is necessary to correct a misstatement,
not to engage in deceit.
Q. And are there different types of stock?
A. There can be, yes.
Q. Can you give some examples of what those
different types of stock might be?
A. Principally you have either common stock or
preferred stock.




























A. You know, it varies based on the corporation
and the type of stock, but generally common stock is the
basic form of ownership interest in a corporation. It
may be voting stock or it may be non-voting stock, but it
is the evidence of an ownership interest which would then
permit a shareholder, someone holding that stock, to
receive the benefits of the operations of that
corporation.
Preferred stock is called preferred because it has
some type of a preference, which means, maybe it has the
right to receive payment from the corporation before
payment goes to the holders of the common stock, maybe it
has the right to vote in preference to the holders of the
common stock. It may have a right to liquidation in
preference to the holders of the common stock, or even
within the preferred holders, there may be a structure
that some preferred holders have benefits that are
superior to the benefits of other preferred holders. But
preferred stock just indicates that it has some type of
right or privilege that ranks ahead of another group of
shareholders.
Q. A moment ago you mentioned that there are --
there's voting stock and non-voting stock. Could you
just briefly describe what the difference between those




























A. Sure. The -- in general, shares of stock
entitle the shareholders to vote on certain matters
relating to the operating of the corporation. They may
be able to vote regarding the election of directors.
They may be able to vote regarding certain business
activities. And so you can have common stock, which is
voting common stock, and permits the shareholders to vote
on those matters.
You can have common stock which is non-voting,
which means that except in certain very limited
situations, the shareholders holding that non-voting
common stock do not have a right to vote. They simply
have a right to receive whatever the economic benefit --
excuse me -- the economic benefit of the corporation
might be.
Q. Is another type of security called an
investment contract?
A. Yes.
Q. And could you explain what that is?
A. Yes. An investment contract is a contract
between two parties which is formed by an investment in a
common enterprise with the expectation of profits to be
generated from the activities of one of the parties.






























Q. And what is that?
A. A warrant generally represents the right to
acquire another security. And so, a warrant might be the
right at some point in the future to purchase shares of
stock. And the warrant is a contract that's executed
that gives a party the right to purchase shares in this
-- you know, in -- an example I'm using, to purchase
shares of stock at some point in the future.
Q. And I'd like to maybe take a step back and
ask you, in the securities industry, if there are
multiple sellers of a security, do -- what are the
obligations of each of the sellers?
A. Each of the sellers would have the same
obligations as the other -- the obligations we've
discussed previously.
MR. PALUMBO: Your Honor, if I could have a moment?
THE COURT: Yes. Could I ask counsel to approach
one more time?
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows).
THE COURT: So you guys know this case has been
around and I just read a new case and Judge Davis did not
find any problem with a witness - with this witness
generally stating examples, so long as it wasn't




























occurred in this case. I understand that there was some
comment about a concurrence by a judge hearsay from one
of the other judges, but the state of the law doesn't
seem to say that any stating of examples is is
exclusively precluded. I think it's so long as it
doesn't explicitly -- I mean, it could mention these
things as an example, as long as the witness is -- is not
saying, well, in this case, this conduct would be -- and
that's what paragraph two says --
MR. PALUMBO: That is my understanding of the law,
too, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- in Moore, right? So, the witness in
Moore gave a definition of material, and then gave a list
of examples. And the opinion was that the list of
examples was general enough that it was okay -- that an
expert witness can give that opinion, so long as it's not
explicitly tied to, or the words used, explicitly mirrors
the allegation made in this case. You don't anticipate,
if you were to ask the witness, that he would just list
these things and then talk about how the allegations in
this case --
MR. PALUMBO: I don't anticipate that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.






























MR. CUMMINGS: One -- I would still like my
objection. Candidly, Moore is one judge.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CUMMINGS: So it's not a majority (inaudible).
THE COURT: Sure, sure. And it's the Court of
Appeals.
MR. CUMMINGS: It's the Court of Appeals, too, so
there's --
THE COURT:Supreme Court could still say something--
MR. CUMMINGS: It's still an open issue.
THE COURT: Mm-hmm.
MR. CUMMINGS: I do think there's issues of law
here.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. CUMMINGS: Specifically giving examples. And
it's -- and again, with this case, different (inaudible)
this case, the issues that we're discussing are squarely
within the layman's understanding of what it is




THE COURT: Okay. So, I'll allow it, as long as






























MR. PALUMBO: Thank you.
(End of sidebar).
MR. PALUMBO: And, Your Honor, if I could just have
a moment?
THE COURT: Yes. Sure.
Q. (BY MR. PALUMBO) Mr. Lloyd, just a few more
questions. Based on your understanding of the securities
industry, a few moments ago we discussed the issue of
material information. Could you give some examples, in
the securities industry, what material information might
include, just generally?
A. Yes. It depends on the individual entity,
but material information would be again information
that's important to an investor making a decision. It
could include information about the business, the
underlying assets of the business, if those assets are
fixed assets that you can touch and feel, or are they
technology assets where you have to understand the nature
of the particular technology. It would include
information about the management, who is it that's
running this enterprise, what's their background, what's
their experience, have they ever been involved in




























been sanctioned by regulators.
It can involve looking at the financial information
about the enterprise in order to determine whether the
financial assets are sufficient to conduct the
operations, and what the -- what the financial statements
look like. It could include risks, what are the risks of
the business, where could this business have problems in
the future, and what's the type of information that an
investor would want to -- would want to know about
potential risks? Those are a few examples.
Q. Thank you. And a few moments ago, you
described various types of securities. Does a security
have to fall into only one category?
A. No, you could have instruments which satisfy
multiple categories.
MR. PALUMBO: Thank you.
And Your Honor, if I could just have one more
moment?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. PALUMBO: Thank you, Mr. Lloyd. Those are all
the questions I have.
THE COURT: Okay. Cross examination?
































Q. And good afternoon, Mr. Lloyd. We met
previously several months ago.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. But just to refresh your memory, my name's
Robert Cummings and I'm representing Mr. Buttars in this
action.
Now, securities can kind of be an ominous word.
But as you said, a security is ostensibly or essentially
an investment, right?
A. Generally, in the industry, that's correct.
Q. Now, I want to give you a definition, and I
want to see if you would understand -- or if you would
agree with me. But a security is one person giving
another person money, and this other person has the
discretion on how to use the money, but the original
person has an expectation of profit. Is that kind of a
fair layout, or --
A. Yeah, roughly, I think that's accurate.
Again, it's generally, in the industry, understood that
the type of security you're referring to would be an
investment contract, which is where one party makes an
investment with the expectation that there will be a




























Q. Or a purchase of stock could be the same,
couldn't it?
A. Purchase of stock would -- is generally
considered to be an investment, so --
Q. Okay. Okay. Perfect. And the company that
you work for, Merit Medical, they issue securities,
correct?
A. We do.
Q. Are you -- is it a public company, or a --
A. It is publicly traded.
Q. And so, by -- when you say publicly traded,
it means that it has shares of stock that are traded on
the NASDAQ or some other -- some other market, correct?
A. Correct. They're traded on the NASDAQ
exchange.
Q. Okay. Now, in order for your company to go
-- to issue those stock, or I think you would agree that
the term is called, 'go public', they had to engage in a
public offering, correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And in that process, they did what you might
refer to as an IPO, or an initial public offering, and
they had to make certain disclosures under what you've
referred to as the securities laws, correct?




























generally yes, that's correct.
Q. Well, and that's an interesting point that
you bring up. The securities laws are very detailed,
right?
A. They are.
Q. IPOs, or initial public offerings that public
companies go through, it's a very complex process,
correct?
A. It is.
Q. So, very smart men like you that are the
general counsels of the company, associate with very
reputable law firms, spend a lot of money to issue these
stocks, correct?
A. In an initial public offering, that's
correct.
Q. Okay. Now, along -- so, those are public
offerings. We also have what are called private
offerings, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in a private offering -- so, let me take
a step back. In a public offering, the IPO package,
there is information disclosed in a complex disclosure, I
can't think of the term for what that disclosure would
be, I don't know if it's proxy, or what would -- what




























A. You're probably thinking of a prospectus.
Q. Prospectus, thank you. So, in the
prospectus, there's detailed, detailed information,
correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And all that information is required by the
securities laws or the SEC, correct? And then we have
private offerings, right? And the same obligations to
disclose information are required in private offerings as
well, correct?
A. Yeah. In the industry, the obligations of
disclosure don't change fundamentally between public and
private companies. There are additional obligations that
public companies would be subject to; but fundamentally,
with respect to the sale of a security, the requirements
are the same for public and private companies.
Q. Okay. But would you agree that the
Securities and Exchange Commission, or the Utah Division
of Securities Laws sets a baseline for the information as
required?
A. Yes.
Q. And can -- would you agree also that an
investment promoter -- do you understand when I say like
an investment promoter, what I mean?




























understand what a promoter is.
Q. So, what would be your --
A. In the industry generally, a promoter is
someone that is looking to sell securities.
Q. Okay. So, would you also agree that an
investment promoter can, through a contract, alter some
of the obligations, or at least disclose to an investor,
'hey, I'm required -- I'm relying upon you to do some due
diligence here.' An investment promoter can do that,
correct?
A. Well, you can't alter the fundamental
obligations that we discussed earlier, which are, you
can't, by contract, alter the obligation not to make
misrepresentations --
Q. Sure.
A. -- or alter the obligation not to omit
material information, or alter the obligation not to
engage in deceit. Those -- those are established by
statute. And so -- so, you wouldn't -- in the industry,
you wouldn't see a contract that somehow tries to alter
those fundamental obligations.
Q. So, obviously I can't say, in this contract,
I may or may not commit fraud, and by signing it, you're
relieving me of that obligation. Is that essentially






























A. -- that's an accurate statement.
Q. So, putting that aside, other information
that might be required, so I can't willfully withhold
information, and I can't willfully lie about information
with a statement, but additional information, a promoter
can tell an investor, you're -- you're relying upon your
own due diligence. That can be done, correct?
A. I'm not sure -- again, you can have
contractual obligations back and forth, and a promoter
can certainly encourage a purchaser to do due diligence.
And, you know, most purchasers engage in some form of due
diligence. But they can't alter by contract the
fundamental obligations that are established by federal
and state laws.
Q. I think we're saying the same things. I
can't by contract tell an investor I may or may not
commit fraud, and I may or may not like you. That's the
baseline that I'm discussing here. But if -- let's
assume that the information does not fall within that
box.
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. Those -- the duties and obligations between




























A. Well, you can -- you can have a contract that
defines what the parties will do in the -- for example,
in the course of due diligence. Again, subject to the
fundamental principle that you can't alter the federal or
state statutes that govern securities fraud.
Q. Sure. So, let me take a step back there.
You referenced that you worked at Parr Brown Gee and
Loveless before you became general counsel at Merit, is
that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Now, you did private offerings for clients,
correct?
A. I did.
Q. Now, in those private offerings, you prepared
subscription agreements for those clients, or something
similar, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And in those agreements, there was listed out
representations of warranties, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And a representational warranty is
essentially what the signatory, in this context, the
investment -- the person making the investment, it's
basically a promise that they're making, is that correct?




























Q. Okay. Now, going back, when I initially said
securities were ominous, at least to me I think it's kind
of a daunting -- daunting concept. And if anybody's ever
delved into the SEC rules, it gives me a headache. But
they're all over the place, right?
A. Securities?
Q. Yes.
A. Are all over the place? You frequently find
securities in most businesses.
Q. In fact, it can -- there can be securities
where you don't even think one -- where one exists,
right?
A. There could be.
Q. And so, we talked about Merit Medical being a
publicly traded company, and stock being traded on like
the NASDAQ, but you could have a mom and pop shop that
says, 'I have a great idea for this bakery, but I need
money.' And one way that a lot of small business owners
get money is through investment and securities, correct?
A. That's true.
Q. And so, for an -- and that's why securities
are all over the place. Anybody that needs money, an
injection of capital, theoretically is entering into the
securities realm?




























Q. And so, just the sheer fact that somebody's
giving money to a promoter, doesn't in and of itself
create fraud, right?
A. No. It would be dependant on the facts and
circumstances of that particular investment.
Q. And in a lot of contexts, or would you agree,
that securities are kind of the backbone of our economy?
Now, let me specifically add on that, for small
businesses and small business growth. Would you agree
with that?
A. Yeah, I guess I'm a little unsure exactly
what the backbone is, but certainly any small business
needs to raise capital, and one of the most common ways
to do that is by issuing securities of some form -- some
sort.
Q. And in your experience as a professional who
worked for Parr Brown Gee and Loveless -- actually, let
me take a step back. You admire your old law firm,
correct?
A. I do.
Q. Merit Medical, I presume with you being
counsel, hires Parr Brown for some of its securities
stuff.
A. We do.




























in town would you consider to be reputable securities
firms?
A. Oh, there are a number of them.
Q. So --
A. Dorsey and Whitney --
Q. Okay.
A. -- Holland and Hart, I could probably come up
with others. Durham Jones and Pinegar.
Q. Ray Quinney and Nebeker?
A. I'm familiar with Ray Quinney Nebeker, yes.
Q. And would you consider them a reputable
securities firm?
A. They are one of the oldest firms in the
state.
Q. Now -- so, going back to -- with private
offerings, a small mom and pop shop needing to raise
money, and if somebody wants to go into that realm, it's
a complex realm, right? And so, in your private
practice, you assisted a lot of people in that arena,
correct? In raising money?
A. That's correct.
MR. CUMMINGS: Can I have one moment, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. CUMMINGS: And it appears -- I just want to




























at the end of the trial on behalf of the state to
testify, so I'll have questions at that point. But I
think that's all.
THE COURT: Can I ask you both to approach? Or all
of you?
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows).
THE COURT: I'm just kind of confused about that.
Is he not testifying today for the -- right now for the
state?
MR. PALUMBO: Yes. I think what Mr. Cummings is
referring to is that the state intends to recall --
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PALUMBO: -- Mr. Lloyd at the end of the trial.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PALUMBO: To kind of refute some additional
securities process.
THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.
MR. CUMMINGS: And to give his opinion.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. PALUMBO: Yeah.
THE COURT: But the issue is that you -- you said
you want to reserve your rights to do what?
MS. TANGARO: Just ask him more questions.
MR. CUMMINGS: Ask additional questions. Yeah.




























saying is, if the state doesn't call him, do you want to
call him? Do you want to put him on call?
MS. TANGARO: We might.
MR. PALUMBO: Within --
THE COURT: So, that's where I'm going. Yes.
MR. PALUMBO: We're calling him.
THE COURT: Are you? Okay.
MS. TANGARO: It's on my list.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. TANGARO: (Inaudible).
MR. CUMMINGS: And, Your Honor, I'm just going to
telegraph too that I'm going to have some objections on
his opinions on the (inaudible) for the same reasons
under State v. Moore.
THE COURT: That's fine.
MR. CUMMINGS: So...
THE COURT: That's fine.
(End of sidebar).
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
Any redirect?





































Q. Mr. Lloyd, in the securities industry, you
and Mr. -- Mr. Cummings asked you some questions about
subscription agreements. Could you just describe again
what a subscription agreement is?
A. A subscription agreement is generally
understood to be an agreement between two parties that
defines the terms of the sale of a security. So, it
could relate to stock, it could relate to limit liability
company interest, it could relate to partnership
interest, but the subscription agreement identifies
what's being sold and what's being paid, and then may
contain other provisions that relate to the transaction.
Q. And in your experience in the industry, are
subscription agreements typically signed prior to, or
after the sale of a security?
A. The intention is that they would be executed
before, because they define the terms of the transaction.
So, to execute it afterwards leaves in question what





























MR. PALUMBO: Thank you.
Nothing further, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Re-cross?
MR. CUMMINGS: Not at this time, Your Honor. Thank
you.
THE COURT: Okay.
Thank you, sir. You may be excused. And again,
subject to recall if either of the parties do.
Next witness for the state?
MR. TAYLOR: The state calls Vince Romney.
THE COURT: Okay. Will you ask Mr. Romney to
please step in, if he's not already in the courtroom?
Mr. Romney, if you'll make your way up here to the
witness stand on my left, please. And before you have a
seat there, please raise your right hand and take the
oath.
VINCENT CLIVE ROMNEY
Having first been duly sworn, testified upon his
oath as follows:
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. TAYLOR:
Q. Can you please tell us your full name?




























contain the obligations of the parties with respect to
the transaction and define what's being sold, and what's
being paid, in exchange for that particular security.
Q. And based on your experience, can a
subscription agreement alter the obligations of a seller
of securities in the securities industry?
A. Well, the subscription agreement defines the
obligations of the two parties as it relates to, you
know, contractual obligations. So what are the
contractual obligations of the two parties? But what a
subscription agreement does not and cannot do is to
change the fundamental obligations that are established
under law with respect to disclosure.
Q. And why is that?
A. We spoke at the outset about how securities
are different from other types of items that you can
purchase. And the public policy is that, because a
security is something that you can't kick the tires, you
can't open and close the doors, you can't touch and feel
a security the same way you can with a car, or a
refrigerator, that the seller of a security has an
obligation to make accurate disclosure. And that the
seller of a security cannot make misrepresentations, or
cannot omit to provide information that's necessary for





























Q. And perhaps we could take that a little
further. And you know, if you were to, for example,
advise a client in your practice regarding a seller's
obligations to make certain disclosures, would you advise
-- would you ever advise a client to withhold certain
disclosures if it was agreed to withhold those
disclosures in a subscription agreement?
A. No, I -- you would not advise a client ever
to withhold information that's -- that's necessary for
the purchaser to assess the merits and the risks of the
transaction.
Q. I believe earlier when you testified
previously, you talked about what a seller's obligations
are in the securities industry. And could you remind us
what those obligations generally entail?
A. Generally, they are not to make
misrepresentations, not to omit material information, and
not to engage in deceit.
Q. And I'd like to ask you a few questions based
on your training and experience of types of things that
you might advise a client to disclose, or that you might
consider important based on your experience in the
securities industry.





























etcetera. This is not a buyer beware situation, this is
a seller beware situation. Purchasing a security is not
like purchasing, as Mr. Lloyd explained, a vehicle or a
refrigerator, something that you can touch, look at,
inspect, take for a test drive. You can't take an
investment for a test drive. You're relying even more on
what the person selling the security is telling you.
And so for that reason, the securities industry and
the law, it all requires the seller to be up front, to
make full disclosures about information that the average
reasonable investor would want to know. And that's
contained in the jury instructions.
If you look at instruction number 45, section
three, a material fact is something which a buyer of
ordinary intelligence and prudence would think to be of
importance in determining whether to buy a security.
And then if you turn to number 46. Under this
allegation, the allegation of securities fraud, this is
the second paragraph, it is not necessary for the state
to prove that the individual investors believed the
statements to be true, nor that they relied upon the
statements in their decisions making -- in their decision
making process. So long as the statements made were such
that a reasonable person in similar circumstances would
have relied upon the statements in making an investment
05611
ADDENDUM G
JACOB S. TAYLOR, Bar No. 10840
Assistant Attorney General
MICHAEL D. PALUMBO, Bar No. 13325
Assistant Attorney General
SEAN D. REYES, Bar No. 7969
Utah Attorney General






Attorneys for the State of Utah
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH





FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER DENYING 




On September 7, 2015, Defendant David Bruce Buttars filed a motion to suppress bank 
records the State obtained from JP Morgan Chase Bank and Frontier Bank through investigative 
subpoenas issued under the Subpoena Powers for Aid in Criminal Investigation and Grant of 
Immunity Act (“Subpoena Powers Act”), Utah Code Ann. Section 77-22-1. The Court held an 
evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress and other motions on September 14, 
2015. The State filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion to suppress on October 13, 2015. 
The Order of the Court is stated below:
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Defendants filed a reply on November 13, 2015. 
On December 3, 2015 the Court heard oral arguments on the Defendant’s motion. 
Assistant Attorneys General Jacob Taylor and Michael Palumbo appeared on behalf of the State. 
Cara Tangaro and Robert Cummings appeared on behalf of the Defendant. Defendant was 
present at the hearing. The District Court, having reviewed the written materials filed by the 
parties and hearing oral arguments, ruled from the bench on December 3, 2015 denying the 
Defendant’s motion.  The Court now enters the following written Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order denying Defendant’s motion consistent with its December 3, 2015 ruling.
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The following factual findings are undisputed and based on filings by the parties, exhibits, and 
testimony obtained during the September 14, 2015 evidentiary hearing in this matter.
The Defendant’s September 7, 2015 motion to suppress concerned investigative 
subpoenas issued by the State between April 2011 and August 2012 under the Subpoena Powers 
Act during an investigation of Defendant for securities fraud and other crimes. The subpoenas 
sought bank records from Frontier Bank and JP Morgan Chase Bank.
The subpoenas contained references to an irrelevant section of the Utah Criminal Code, 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-22a. Specifically, the subpoenas told the recipients of the subpoenas 
(JP Morgan Chase Bank and Frontier Bank) that under Utah Code Ann. Section 77-22a, they 
were prohibited from disclosing the subpoenas to any third party. The inclusion of this language 
was an error.
Prior to issuing the investigative subpoenas, the State filed a Statement of Good Cause 
with the Third District Court and obtained an Order authorizing the investigation under the 
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Subpoena Powers Act from a magistrate. A magistrate reviewed and signed the Statement of 
Good Cause. 
A magistrate reviewed each subpoena before it was issued. The magistrate’s review was 
for the purpose of determining whether the subpoenas were reasonably related to the criminal 
investigation authorized by the court, as required under Utah Code Ann. Section 77-22-2(3)(b)
(ii). The Defendant does not challenge the good cause basis for the criminal investigation or that 
the subpoenas were reasonably related to the criminal investigation.
The State did not seek or obtain a secrecy order from the Court to keep the investigation 
or materials obtained through the subpoenas secret. 
After serving the subpoenas on JP Morgan Chase Bank and Frontier Bank, the State 
obtained bank records of the Defendant. 
The State did not notify Defendant when it sought an order authorizing a criminal 
investigation, nor did the State notify Defendant when it issued subpoenas to the Defendant’s 
banks. 
The bank records obtained by the state through the investigative subpoenas were used in 
an investigation that led to criminal charges against Defendant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The questions presented by Defendant’s motion are: (1) Whether the subpoenas issued by 
the State were unlawful due to the erroneous reference to Utah Code Ann. Section77-22a or 
because the State did not give notice to the Defendant when the subpoenas were issued; (2) if the 
subpoenas were unlawful, would the good faith exception apply; (3) and finally, if the subpoenas 
were unlawful, whether exclusion would be the appropriate remedy. 
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Although individuals in Utah have an expectation of privacy right in bank records, the 
State may nevertheless search and seize bank records through a lawful subpoena under the 
Subpoena Powers Act. 
A. The State is Not Required to Give Notice to a Suspect in a Criminal Investigation When 
the State Issues Subpoenas to Banks for a Suspect’s Bank Records
The Subpoena Powers Act does not require the State to provide notice to the subject of a 
criminal investigation when the State initiates an investigation or issues subpoenas under the 
Subpoena Powers Act. Neither State v. Yount, 2008 UT App 102, 182 P.3d 405 (2008), nor State  
v. Thompson¸810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), creates a notice requirement for subpoenas issued under 
the Subpoena Powers Act. Furthermore, the Subpoena Powers Act, itself, does not contain a 
requirement that the State provide notice to the subject of records when the State issues an 
investigative subpoena. The notice requirements in the Subpoena Powers Act pertain only to the 
party to whom the subpoena is issued—in this case, the banks.
State v. Thompson was a case decided under the pre-1989 version of the Subpoena 
Powers Act and the changes in the Act appear to be a direct response to the issues in Thompson 
and In the Matter of Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (1988). In those cases, the issues 
centered on whether a defendant had a right to privacy in bank records, and whether the state 
should seek judicial approval to obtain bank records because of defendant’s expectation of 
privacy. 
B. The Erroneous Reference to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-22a Did Not Render the 
Subpoenas Unlawful
The inclusion of the secrecy language from Utah Code Ann Section 77-22a in the 
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subpoenas did not make the subpoenas unlawful or unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
or Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The state met all the requirements of obtaining 
a lawful subpoena by having the subpoenas reviewed and signed by a magistrate who also 
determined that the subpoenas were reasonably related to a criminal investigation based on good 
cause. 
The secrecy provision of the Subpoena Powers Act exists to protect the innocent and to 
prevent criminal suspects from having access to information prior to prosecution. The fact that 
the 77-22a language was included in the subpoenas does not render the subpoenas unlawful. 
Whether a secrecy order is properly granted is not a basis for attacking the validity of the 
underlying subpoena. This is particularly true in the present case where the Defendant has not 
attacked the good cause statement or that the subpoenas were reasonably related to the criminal 
investigation. The purpose of the secrecy order is not to create a right for the defendant to move 
to suppress the evidence. 
Even if the secrecy provision was not included in the subpoena, there is no evidence that 
the defendant would have known about the subpoenas or that he would have successfully moved 
to quash them. 
C. Even if the Subpoenas Were Found to be Unlawful, the Good Faith Exception Would 
Apply
The reasoning applied by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Dominguez, 248 P.3d 473 
(2011), is compelling in the present case. Failing to meet perfectly the procedural requirements 
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of the subpoena powers act, or in this case, including the language from 77-22a, does not 
automatically implicate the Defendant’s constitutional rights. The Court has determined that 
including the 77-22a language did not render the subpoenas unlawful. But, even if it did, the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply to this case. The state and federal 
cases that have applied to the good faith exception are on par with the present case. Specifically, 
the cases dealing with search warrants are instructive.
The ruling in State v. Thompson, is based on different facts, and was decided under the 
pre-1989 Subpoena Powers Act. Under the Act in effect at the time of Thompson, the State had 
the unilateral authority to issue subpoenas without judicial oversight. Thompson is 
distinguishable from the present case due to the fact that the State obtained judicial review of the 
investigative subpoenas and reasonably relied on the Court’s approval of the subpoenas.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, consistent with the District Court’s December 3, 2015 ruling from the bench, the 
District Court hereby ORDERS that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
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Plaintiff, the state of Utah (the “State”) filed a Motion for Admission of Evidence (the 
“Motion”) on August 28, 2015. The Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding the Motion, along 
with Defendant David Bruce Buttars’ (“Mr. Buttars”) Motion to Suppress, on September 14, 2015. 
Pursuant to the Court’s scheduling order entered on the record on September 14, 2015 (docket, 
9/24/2015, Hr’ing Trans, at 96-97), the State filed a Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for 
Admission of Evidence on October 13, 2015. Mr. Buttars filed his Opposition to the State’s Motion 
on November 13, 2015. Finally, on November 27, 2015, the State filed its reply in further support of 
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the Motion.  Further more the Court incorporates by reference the ruling issued on the record on this 
motion.
Having considered the briefs and arguments of counsel, the Court hereby DENIES the 
Motion without prejudice.  The State may resubmit the motion and raise Rule 703 second prong and 
other hearsay issues.   As explained below, while the Court finds that the State met its burden of 
proving the authenticity of the bank records at issue, the bank records are still nonetheless hearsay 
evidence. And the State has not met its burden of providing sufficient evidence to establish 
foundation for a hearsay exception to apply. Because the parties did not brief the second prong of 
Utah R. Evid. 703 (i.e., the probative value of disclosing the bank records to the jury substantially 
outweighs their prejudicial effect), the Court denies the State’s Motion at this time. 
BACKGROUND
The State moves for an order of the Court admitting evidence in advance of trial pursuant to 
Utah R. Evid. 104. Specifically, the State seeks admission of summaries of bank records at issue in 
this case. In its supplemental brief in support of the Motion, the State argues that the summaries are 
admissible pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 703, 803(6), and 1006. Mr. Buttars makes two arguments as to 
why the summaries are not admissible. First, Mr. Buttars argues that the summaries are not 
admissible based upon his arguments raised in his Motion to Suppress Evidence. (Docket, 
9/7/2015.) The Court denied Mr. Buttars’ Motion to Suppress. (Docket, 1/12/2016.) Therefore, the 
Court rejects Mr. Buttars’ first argument based upon the reasons stated in the order denying Mr. 
Buttars’ Motion to Suppress. (Id.)
Second, Mr. Buttars argues that the summaries are inadmissible because the underlying bank 
records upon which the State bases its summaries are inadmissible. Specifically, Mr. Buttars argues 
that the bank records have insufficient foundation and lack authenticity. The Court will address each 
of these arguments in turn.
April 08, 2016 09:33 AM 2 of 8
01149
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The State has seven (7) summaries prepared based upon various bank records collected 
pursuant to subpoenas issued in this case. (Docket, 9/14/2015, State’s Exhs. 1 through 7.)
2. The State’s accounting expert, John Curtis, prepared the summaries based upon the bank 
records obtained from JP Morgan Chase and Frontier Bank.
3. John Curtis has been a forensic accountant for 17 years.
4. Based upon the submissions by the parties, Mr. Curtis appears to be qualified to opine as a 
forensic accountant.
5. Mr. Curtis received and reviewed the bank records.
6. Regarding the Frontier Bank records, it appears that the Agent Nesbit collected the records 
in person, via U.S. Mail, and also via E-Mail.
7. There are, however, only two custodian certifications provided by Frontier Bank with some 
of the records.
8. Mr. Curtis testified during the September 14, 2015 evidentiary hearing that it did not appear 
that any of the bank records were missing.
9. Likewise, Mr. Curtis testified that he received and reviewed the verifications provided by 
Frontier Bank with the bank records.
10.There are two records custodian certificates from Frontier Bank.
11.Agent Nesbit testified that he received records from Frontier Bank on three or four 
occasions.
12.The bank records are voluminous in nature.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The State bears the burden of proving admissibility. At play in the State’s Motion are Utah 
R. Evid. 703, 803, 901, and 1006. Each are discussed below.
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I. Utah R. Evid. 1006  
Utah R. Evid. 1006 provides, in pertinent part, “[t]he proponent may use a summary, chart, 
or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot 
be conveniently examined in court.” This is an exception to the best evidence rule, Utah R. Evid. 
1002. As noted above, the moving party, the State here, bears the burden of “establish[ing] a 
foundation that the underlying materials on which [the summaries] are based are admissible 
evidence.” Trolley v. Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Here, the voluminous requirement of Utah R. Evid. 1006 is satisfied. Rule 1006, however, 
cannot be used as a cover for inadmissible evidence. Therefore, in order to make the summaries 
admissible, the State must: 1) there must be competent evidence to establish authenticity; and 2) 
provide testimony to establish the foundation for the underlying bank records.
I. Authenticity  
Pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 901, “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying 
an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
item is what the proponent claims it is.” Utah R. Evid. 901(a). The rule provides a non-exhaustive 
list of examples through which the proponent of evidence can satisfy the requirement. Relevant here 
are subsection (1) and (4). Subsection (1) states: “Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge. 
Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be.” Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(1). Subsection (4) states: 
“Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or 
other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.” Utah R. 
Evid. 901(b)(4).
These two subsections are met here. To the first subsection, Agent Nesbit is a “witness with 
knowledge.” At the September 14, 2015 evidentiary hearing, Agent Nesbit testified that he either 
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personally picked up the bank records from Frontier Bank or otherwise received them via U.S. Mail 
or E-Mail from Frontier Bank. To the fourth subsection, Mr. Curtis, the State’s forensic accountant, 
testified that the bank records appeared to be complete. Therefore, the State has met its burden of 
authentication as required by Utah R. Evid. 901. 
I. Expert’s Reliance on Inadmissible Evidence  
The State contends that the bank records are admissible based upon Utah R. Evid. 703 and 
901. Utah R. Evid. 703 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n expert may base an opinion on facts or 
data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the 
particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the 
subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.” In other words, once the expert 
is qualified, that expert can rely upon inadmissible evidence. But the rule continues: “But if the facts 
or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury 
only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their 
prejudicial effect.” Utah R. Evid. 703. 
Regardless if the bank records are ultimately admissible on their own, the Court finds that 
Mr. Curtis can rely upon the bank records as part of his expert opinion. Mr. Curtis appears to be 
qualified to testify as a forensic accountant. He has practiced as a forensic accountant for 17 years, 
and otherwise appears to be competent to testify in that field. Because Mr. Curtis appears to be 
qualified to opine as a forensic accountant, Mr. Curtis can rely upon the bank records to form his 
opinion.
I. Admissibility of Bank Records  
Utah R. Evid. 802 states that “[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by 
these rules.” While the Court finds that the State has provided sufficient evidence to authenticate the 
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bank records and that Mr. Curtis can rely upon the bank records pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 703, the 
hearsay consideration is different than authentication and Rule 703. And the Court finds that the 
entries on the bank records are hearsay. 
The State contends that Utah R. Evid. 803(6) applies here as an exception to the hearsay 
rule. That rule states that “[a] record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis [is admissible] 
if” certain conditions are met. Utah R. Evid. 803(6). In order to meet this requirement, the State 
must show: “(A) the record was made at or near the time by – or from information transmitted by – 
someone with knowledge; (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of 
a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; (C) making the record was 
a regular practice of that activity; … [and] (E) neither the source of information nor the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate of lack of trustworthiness.” Utah R. Evid. 803(6)(A)-(E). The 
rule provides, however, that (A) through (C) can be “shown by the testimony of the custodian or 
another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a 
statute permitting certification[.]” Utah R. Evid. 803(6)(D).
In short, the State needs to provide foundation in support of the bank records to establish an 
indicia of reliability. The State has not been able to establish the necessary foundation. The record 
reflects that there are two records custodian certificates from Frontier Bank, and the State has 
conceded that there are no other records custodian certificates. Agent Nesbit testified, however, that 
he received records from Frontier Bank on three or four occasions. Therefore, the State has not met 
its burden under Utah R. Evid. 803(6) and 902(11)-(12). The bank records contain inadmissible 
hearsay, and are therefore inadmissible on their own.
Rule 703, however, has an additional component. In order to have inadmissible evidence 
upon which an expert relies disclosed to the jury, the proponent of the evidence must establish that 
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the “probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their 
prejudicial effect.” The parties have not briefed this issue. Therefore, the Court cannot at this point 
decide the issue of admissibility under the second prong of Rule 703.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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On the 15th day of March, 2016, I mailed/delivered/electronically filed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
STATE’S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE. Either a copy was mailed to 
the Utah Attorney General’s Office, 5272 South College Drive, #200, Utah 84321, or 
electronic notice was sent to the email address on record with the court. 
 
 
/s/ Robert B. Cummings 
ROBERT B. CUMMINGS
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH





FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER GRANTING 





After considering the State’s Motion for the Admission of Evidence, as well as all briefs, 
evidence, and arguments by the parties, the Court GRANTS the State’s motion to admit bank 
record summaries at trial.
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On August 28, 2015, the State moved this Court to rule on the admissibility of bank 
record summaries prior to trial. The State argued, among other things that the summaries are 
The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: June 14, 2016 /s/ Vernice Trease
11:43:52 AM District Court Judge
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admissible under Utah R. of Evid. 1006 because they distill voluminous bank records that cannot 
be conveniently examined in court. Further, the State argued that the underlying bank records 
upon which the summaries are based are admissible under Utah R. of Evid. 703, or alternatively 
under Utah R. of Evid. 803(6).
An evidentiary hearing was held on September 14, 2015 during which John Curtis, the 
State’s forensic accounting expert, and Special Agent Scott Nesbitt testified. During that hearing, 
Agent Nesbitt testified that beginning in 2011 he sought and obtained investigative subpoenas 
through the Salt Lake County District Attorney’s Office. Agent Nesbitt described the process he 
followed for obtaining the subpoenas, and further testified that he obtained responsive bank 
records on several occasions from Frontier Bank and JP Morgan Chase. Agent Nesbitt testified 
that he scanned and made copies of these records and provided them to the Attorney General’s 
Office and the Division of Securities. Agent Nesbitt testified that the records he obtained from 
Frontier Bank and JP Morgan Chase appeared to be complete. In total, Agent Nesbitt obtained 
records for six Frontier Bank accounts, and four JP Morgan Chase bank accounts. In addition 
Agent Nesbitt obtained certificates of authenticity from Frontier Bank and JP Morgan Chase 
Bank.
Also during the September 14, 2015 hearing, John Curtis testified that he received copies 
of the bank records from the Attorney General’s Office. Mr. Curtis reviewed all of the bank 
records, which consisted of approximately 500-700 pages.  Mr. Curtis determined that the bank 
records appeared to be complete. Mr. Curtis testified that some check images were missing from 
the records. However, Mr. Curtis testified, this is not uncommon. Mr. Curtis did not send out his 
own subpoenas, but he verified and analyzed the records he reviewed. Based on Mr. Curtis’s 
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review, it appeared to him that the bank records were what they purported to be. Based on Mr. 
Curtis’s review of the bank records, he formed an opinion as to whether the transactions at issue 
in this case had characteristics of fraud. 
This Court heard oral argument on the State’s motion for the admission of evidence, and 
other motions, on December 3, 2015. 
On February 22, 2016 this Court denied the State’s motion without prejudice. The Court 
issued written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on April 8, 2016. The Court denied the 
State’s motion to admit evidence pursuant to Utah R. of Evid. 703 because, while the State 
established the first prong of Utah R. of Evid. 703 (i.e. bank records are the type of evidence a 
forensic accounting expert would typically rely upon), the State did not address the second prong 
of Rule 703 (i.e. the evidence is more probative to helping the jury evaluate the expert opinion). 
The Court also held that the State met its burden of proving authenticity of the bank records. The 
Court invited further briefing on the issue of admissibility of the bank records and/or summaries 
to address the second prong of Rule 703 and other hearsay issues.
On March 16, 2016 the State submitted its Second Supplemental Brief in support of its 
motion to admit evidence. In that brief, the State addressed the second prong of Utah R. of Evid. 
703. The State also made an alternative argument under the residual hearsay exception, Utah R. 
of Evid. 807. Defendant filed an opposition, and the State filed a reply. Oral argument was held 
on May 10, 2016.
On May 23, 2016 the Court issued an oral ruling on the State’s second supplemental 
brief, and GRANTED the State’s motion for admission of evidence. The Court incorporated by 
reference its prior Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order from February 22, 2016.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Evidence admitted under Utah R. of Evid.  703 can be used only for the purpose of 
assisting the jury in evaluating an expert’s opinion. Evidence admitted under Utah R. of Evid. 
807 can be used for its substance. The Court finds that the bank records and bank summaries are 
admissible under the residual hearsay exception, Utah R. of Evid. Rule 807. Because the bank 
records and summaries are admissible for their substance under Rule 807, the Court does not 
address whether the records or summaries are also admissible under Rule 703.  
I. The Bank Records Are Admissible Under Utah R. of Evid. 807
Utah R. of Evid. 807 allows hearsay statements to be admitted even if the statement is not 
specifically covered by a hearsay exception Utah R. of Evid. 803 or 804, as long as the statement 
satisfies four prongs:
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness;
(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any 
other evidence that the proponent can obtain through 
reasonable efforts; and
(4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice.
Additionally, in order for a statement to be admitted under Utah R. of Evid. 807, the 
proponent of the evidence must provide the opposing party “reasonable notice of the intent to 
offer the statement and its particulars, including the declarant's name and address, so that the 
party has a fair opportunity to meet it.”
The bank records that the State seeks to introduce were lawfully obtained through 
subpoena (See Order, December 28, 2015). Additionally, the bank records have been properly 
authenticated. (See Order, April 8, 2016,  at 5). Taking all facts and arguments into 
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consideration, this Court finds that the bank records from Frontier and JP Morgan Chase satisfy 
each of the four prongs of the residual hearsay exception, Utah R. of Evid. 807.
a. The Notice Requirement Has Been Met
On August 28, 2015 the State provided notice to this Court and the defendant that it 
intends to introduce summaries of bank records at trial. The defendant has been on notice of the 
State’s intent to introduce the bank records and/or summaries for many months.  
The State initially sought to introduce the bank records and summaries under Rule 703. 
However, on March 16, 2016 the State argued for admission of the bank records or summaries 
under Utah R. of Evid. 807 in its second supplemental brief. Defendant has had an opportunity to 
respond to this argument in his opposition, filed on April 11, 2016. At that time, a jury trial was 
not set. It was not until May 10, 2016 that the Court set a four day jury trial for September 2016. 
The jury trial is several months away. The defendant has had a fair opportunity to respond to the 
State’s argument for admission under Utah R. of Evid. 807. Additionally, the defendant has had 
an opportunity to cross examine John Curtis and Agent Nesbitt regarding the records. Defendant 
will have further opportunities to do so at trial. The defendant has a substantial amount of time to 
prepare to meet the evidence at trial. Therefore the Court finds that the State has satisfied the 
notice requirement of Utah R. of Evid. 807.  
b. The Bank Statements Have Equivalent Circumstantial Guarantees of 
Trustworthiness
The question under the first prong of Rule 807 is whether the bank records have 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, similar to other exceptions under the 
hearsay rules such as business records, family records, certain public records, and so forth. In 
this case, the bank records have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. There is 
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both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support the trustworthiness of the records. Therefore, the 
first factor of Utah R. of Evid. 807 weighs in favor of admission of the bank records. 
First, although the State cannot produce authentication certificates for all bank records 
the State obtained from Frontier Bank, the State does have certificates for some of the Frontier 
bank records.1 These certificates state the things required by Utah R. of Evid. 803(6) to establish 
trustworthiness for records of regularly conducted activity. For example, the certificates state that 
that the records were kept in the usual course of business, and that the entries in the bank records 
were generally prepared contemporaneously with the events described. In other words, the 
certificates generally describe the authenticity of records maintained by that bank, and speak to 
the reliability of the bank records. All Frontier bank records were provided to the State by the 
same personnel and in the same manner in response to lawful subpoenas. 
Further, the bank records have been authenticated under Rule 902 through the testimony 
of Agent Nesbitt and John Curtis. Agent Nesbitt testified about how he obtained the records 
through an investigative subpoena. Mr. Curtis is a forensic accountant with 17 years of 
experience and a CPA. In light of testimony presented about his qualifications, education, and 
experience, the Court has found that he is an expert qualified to testify and give an opinion on 
bank records, fraudulent activities related to finances, including investigating and analyzing 
records of companies, banks, and individuals alleged to have engaged in fraud. Mr. Curtis 
testified that he received and reviewed the bank records from Frontier and JP Morgan Chase. He 
also testified that he reviewed these accounts and all the information related to these accounts. It 
did not appear to Mr. Curtis that any records were missing from the bank records, aside from one 
1 JP Morgan Chase provided certificates of authentication that appear to meet the requirements of Rule 803(6). 
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or two missing check images. But, this is fairly common, and not a big issue in determining the 
accuracy and so forth of the records. Mr. Curtis also testified that there were approximately 500-
700 pages of the records. He reviewed the records to determine if they were what they purported 
to be and if he could rely on the records to render his opinion. He testified that in every way, the 
bank records appeared to be authentic documents. 
The Court finds that the bank records have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, and so meet the first prong of Utah R. of Evid. 807. 
c. The bank records are evidence of a material fact
It is uncontroverted that bank records and/or summaries are crucial to this case. The bank 
records/summaries are evidence of a material fact. This factor weighs in favor of admission.
d. The bank records are more probative than any other evidence to show 
how investor funds were used
The third factor of Utah R. of Evid. 807 weighs in favor of admission. The bank records, 
and/or summaries, are more probative of whether a fraud or theft occurred because they show 
what happened to the investment money of victims. There is no other evidence that can be 
presented or obtained through other reasonable means or efforts to show what happened to 
investor funds, which is a vital question in this case. 
e. Admitting the bank records will serve the best interests of justice.
A jury trial is a search for truth. The evidence contained in the bank records and 
summaries can assist in that search. Whether the bank records and summaries benefit the state or 
the defendant is not the determining factor. The testimony given by Mr. Curtis and Agent Nesbitt 
June 14, 2016 11:43 AM 7 of 8
01222
is that these records contain information about the money alleged to be invested and how it was 
used. The bank records come in regardless of whether the records show the money was used 
appropriately or inappropriately. The purposes of the rules and interest of justice is met when 
trustworthy, relevant information and evidence is admitted to assist the jury in the search for the 
truth. 
ORDER
The bank records satisfy all four prongs of Utah R. of Evid. 807. The State has also 
provided notice to the defendant as required under that rule. Therefore, the bank records are 
admissible for their substance. Because the bank records are admissible, this Court finds the 
summaries of bank records are admissible under Rule 1006
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the State’s Motion for Admission of 
Evidence.
COURT’S SIGNATURE CONTAINED ON TOP OF FIRST PAGE
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ADDENDUM I
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 14 
 
Article I, Section 14.   [Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance of warrant.] 
     The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
U. S. Constitution Amendment IV 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.  
 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
 
Rule 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, 
Waste of Time, or Other Reasons 
 
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. 
 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. – The language of this rule has been amended as 
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood 
and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These 
changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result 
in any ruling on evidence admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for 
exclusion of relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of substance, 
since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained in 
Rule 403. See also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that 
a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of dealing 
with "surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 
1977)(surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and 
violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v. 
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 
1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). 
Utah R. Evid. 702 
 
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts 
  
(a)   Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who is qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue. 
  
(b)      Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis 
for expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or 
methods that are underlying in the testimony 
  
               (1) are reliable, 
               (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and 
               (3) have been reliably applied to the facts. 
  
(c)      The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the 
underlying principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data and 
the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by 
the relevant expert community. 
  
 
Utah R. Evid. 704 
 
Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue. 
  
(a)      In General — Not Automatically Objectionable. An opinion is not 
objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue. 
(b)      Exception. In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an 
opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or 
condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those 
matters are for the trier of fact alone. 
  
  
Utah R. Evid. 801 
 
Rule 801. Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from Hearsay 
 
 (a)      Statement. “Statement” means a person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or 
nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion. 
 
 (b)      Declarant. “Declarant” means the person who made the statement. 
 
 (c)      Hearsay. “Hearsay” means a statement that: 
 
 (1)   the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and 
 
 (2)   a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. 
 
 (d)      Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the following 
conditions is not hearsay: 
 
 (1)   A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is subject to 
cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement: 
 
(A)   is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the declarant denies having made 
the statement or has forgotten, or 
 
(B)   is consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper 
influence or motive in so testifying; or 
 
 (C)   identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier. 
 
 (2)   An Opposing Party’s Statement. The statement is offered against an opposing party 
and: 
 
(A)   was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity; 
 
(B)   is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true; 
 
(C)   was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the 
subject; 
 
(D)   was made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that 
relationship and while it existed; or 
 
(E)   was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
 
 
Utah R. Evid. 802 
 
Rule 802. The Rule Against Hearsay 
 
 Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules. 
 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. – The language of this rule has been amended as part of 
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make 
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
 
Utah R. Evid. 803 
 
Rule 803. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay — Regardless of Whether the 
Declarant Is Available as a Witness 
 
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the 
declarant is available as a witness: 
 
 (1)   Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or 
condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. 
 
(2)   Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. 
 
(3)   Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement of the 
declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, 
sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not 
including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed 
unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant’s will. 
 
(4)   Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. A statement that: 
 
(A)   is made for — and is reasonably pertinent to — medical diagnosis or treatment; and 
 
(B)   describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; 
or their general cause. 
 
(5)   Recorded Recollection. A record that: 
 
(A)   is on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall well enough to 
testify fully and accurately; 
 
(B)   was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness’s 
memory; and 
 
(C)   accurately reflects the witness’s knowledge. 
 
If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may be received as an exhibit only 
if offered by an adverse party. 
 
(6)   Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record of an act, event, condition, 
opinion, or diagnosis if: 
 
 (A)   the record was made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by 
— someone with knowledge; 
 
(B)   the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, 
organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; 
 
(C)   making the record was a regular practice of that activity; 
 
(D)   all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified 
witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute 
permitting certification; and 
 
(E)   neither the source of information nor the method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 
 
(7)   Absence of a Record of a Regularly Conducted Activity. Evidence that a matter is 
not included in a record described in paragraph (6) if: 
 
(A)   the evidence is admitted to prove that the matter did not occur or exist; 
 
(B)   a record was regularly kept for a matter of that kind; and 
 
(C)   neither the possible source of the information nor other circumstances indicate a 
lack of trustworthiness. 
 
(8)   Public Records. A record or statement of a public office if: 
 
(A)   it sets out: 
 
(i)    the office’s activities; 
 
(ii)   a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not including, in a criminal 
case, a matter observed by law-enforcement personnel; or 
 
(iii)  in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, factual findings from a 
legally authorized investigation; and 
 
(B)   neither the source of information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of 
trustworthiness. 
 
(9)   Public Records of Vital Statistics. A record of a birth, death, or marriage, if reported 
to a public office in accordance with a legal duty. 
 
 (10) Absence of a Public Record. Testimony — or a certification under Rule 902 — that 
a diligent search failed to disclose a public record or statement if the testimony or 
certification is admitted to prove that: 
 
(A)   the record or statement does not exist; or 
 
(B)   a matter did not occur or exist, if a public office regularly kept a record or statement 
for a matter of that kind. 
 
(11) Records of Religious Organizations Concerning Personal or Family History. A 
statement of birth, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, death, relationship by blood or 
marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept 
record of a religious organization. 
 
(12) Certificates of Marriage, Baptism, and Similar Ceremonies. A statement of fact 
contained in a certificate: 
 
(A)   made by a person who is authorized by a religious organization or by law to perform 
the act certified; 
 
(B)   attesting that the person performed a marriage or similar ceremony or administered 
a sacrament; and 
 
(C)   purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time 
after it. 
 
(13) Family Records. A statement of fact about personal or family history contained in a 
family record, such as a Bible, genealogy, chart, engraving on a ring, inscription on a 
portrait, or engraving on an urn or burial marker. 
 
(14) Records of Documents That Affect an Interest in Property. The record of a document 
that purports to establish or affect an interest in property if: 
 
(A)   the record is admitted to prove the content of the original recorded document, along 
with its signing and its delivery by each person who purports to have signed it; 
 
(B)   the record is kept in a public office; and 
 
(C)   a statute authorizes recording documents of that kind in that office. 
 
(15) Statements in Documents That Affect an Interest in Property. A statement contained 
in a document that purports to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter 
stated was relevant to the document’s purpose — unless later dealings with the property 
are inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document. 
 
(16) Statements in Ancient Documents. A statement in a document that is at least 20 
years old and whose authenticity is established. 
 
(17) Market Reports and Similar Commercial Publications. Market quotations, lists, 
directories, or other compilations that are generally relied on by the public or by persons 
in particular occupations. 
 
(18) Statements in Learned Treatises, Periodicals, or Pamphlets. A statement contained in 
a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet if: 
 
(A)   the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness on cross-examination or 
relied on by the expert on direct examination; and 
 
(B)   the publication is established as a reliable authority by the expert’s admission or 
testimony, by another expert’s testimony, or by judicial notice. 
 
If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit. 
 
(19) Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History. A reputation among a person’s 
family by blood, adoption, or marriage — or among a person’s associates or in the 
community — concerning the person’s birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, 
divorce, death, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, or similar facts of personal 
or family history. 
 
(20) Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General History. A reputation in a community 
— arising before the controversy — concerning boundaries of land in the community or 
customs that affect the land, or concerning general historical events important to that 
community, state, or nation. 
 
(21) Reputation Concerning Character. A reputation among a person’s associates or in 
the community concerning the person’s character. 
 
(22) Judgment of a Previous Conviction. Evidence of a final judgment of conviction if: 
 
(A)   the judgment was entered after a trial or guilty plea, but not a nolo contendere plea; 
 
(B)   the conviction was for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more 
than a year; 
 
(C)   the evidence is admitted to prove any fact essential to the judgment; and 
 
 (D)   when offered by the prosecutor in a criminal case for a purpose other than 
impeachment, the judgment was against the defendant. 
 
The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility. 
 
 (23) Judgments Involving Personal, Family, or General History or a Boundary. A 
judgment that is admitted to prove a matter of personal, family, or general history, or 
boundaries, if the matter: 
 
 (A)   was essential to the judgment; and 
 
 (B)   could be proved by evidence of reputation. 
 




Utah R. Evid. 807 
 
Rule 807. Residual Exception 
 
 (a)      In General. Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is not 
excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically covered by a 
hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: 
 
 (1)   the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; 
 
 (2)   it is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
 
 (3)   it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that 
the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and 
 
 (4)   admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice. 
 
 (b)      Notice. The statement is admissible only if, before the trial or hearing, the 
proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer the statement and 
its particulars, including the declarant’s name and address, so that the party has a fair 
opportunity to meet it. 
 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. – The language of this rule has been amended as part of 
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make 
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
 
This rule transfers identical provisions Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) to a new Rule 
807 to reflect the organization found in the Federal Rules of Evidence. No substantive 





Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1006 
RULE 1006. SUMMARIES TO PROVE CONTENT 
 
 
The proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous 
writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court. The 
proponent must make the originals or duplicates available for examination or copying, or both, 
by other parties at a reasonable time or place. And the court may order the proponent to produce 











Utah Code § 61-1-1 
§ 61-1-1. Fraud unlawful 
 
 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any 
security, directly or indirectly to: 
  
 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
  
 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they are made, not misleading; or 
  
 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as 










Utah Code § 61-1-21 
§ 61-1-21. Penalties for violations 
Effective: May 10, 2016 
 
 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully violates: 
 
(a) a provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16; 
 
(b) an order issued under this chapter; or 
 
(c) Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement made is false or misleading in a material 
respect. 
 
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this section, a person who willfully violates Section 
61-1-1: 
 
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime was committed, the 
property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth 
less than $10,000; or 
 
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if, at the time the crime was committed, the 
property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth 
$10,000 or more. 
 
(3) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1 is guilty of a second degree felony if: 
 
(a) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully 
obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less than $10,000; and 
 
(b) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted any money 
representing: 
 
(i) equity in a person’s primary residence; 
 
(ii) a withdrawal from an individual retirement account; 
 
(iii) a withdrawal from a qualified retirement plan as defined in the Internal 
Revenue Code1; 
 




(v) an investment by a person that the violator knows is a vulnerable adult. 
 
(4) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1 is guilty of a second degree felony 
punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than three years or 
more than 15 years if: 
 
(a) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully 
obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or more; and 
 
(b) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted any money 
representing: 
 
(i) equity in a person’s primary residence; 
 
(ii) a withdrawal from an individual retirement account; 
 
(iii) a withdrawal from a qualified retirement plan as defined in the Internal 
Revenue Code; 
 
(iv) an investment by a person over whom the violator exercises undue influence; 
or 
 
(v) an investment by a person that the violator knows is a vulnerable adult. 
 
(5) When amounts of property, money, or other things are unlawfully obtained or 
sought to be obtained under a series of acts or continuing course of business, whether 
from the same or several sources, the amounts may be aggregated in determining the 
level of offense. 
 
(6) It is an affirmative defense under this section against a claim that the person 
violated an order issued under this chapter for the person to prove that the person had 
no knowledge of the order. 
 
(7) In addition to any other penalty for a criminal violation of this chapter, the 





Laws 1963, c. 145, § 1; Laws 1971, c. 155, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 284, § 30; Laws 1990, c. 133, 
§ 14; Laws 1991, c. 161, § 12; Laws 1992, c. 216, § 4; Laws 1997, c. 160, § 10, eff. May 5, 
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Utah Code § 76-2-103 
§ 76-2-103. Definitions 
A person engages in conduct: 
 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or 
to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
 
(3) Recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor’s standpoint. 
 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. 
The risk must be of a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 










Utah Code § 77-22-2 
§ 77-22-2. Investigations--Right to subpoena witnesses and require production of 
evidence--Contents of subpoena--Rights of witnesses--Interrogation before closed 
court--Disclosure of information 
 
(1) As used in this section, “prosecutor” means the attorney general, county attorney, district 
attorney, or municipal attorney. 
 
(2)(a) In any matter involving the investigation of a crime or malfeasance in office, or any 
criminal conspiracy or activity, the prosecutor may, upon application and approval of the district 
court and for good cause shown, conduct a criminal investigation. 
 
(b) The application and statement of good cause shall state whether or not any other 
investigative order related to the investigation at issue has been filed in another court. 
 
(3)(a) Subject to the conditions established in Subsection (3)(b), the prosecutor may: 
 
(i) subpoena witnesses; 
 
(ii) compel their attendance and testimony under oath to be recorded by a suitable 
electronic recording device or to be given before any certified court reporter; and 
 
(iii) require the production of books, papers, documents, recordings, and any other items 
that constitute evidence or may be relevant to the investigation. 
 
(b) The prosecutor shall: 
 
(i) apply to the district court for each subpoena; and 
 
(ii) show that the requested information is reasonably related to the criminal investigation 
authorized by the court. 
 
(4)(a) The prosecutor shall state in each subpoena: 
 
(i) the time and place of the examination; 
 
(ii) that the subpoena is issued in aid of a criminal investigation; and 
 
(iii) the right of the person subpoenaed to have counsel present. 
 
(b) The examination may be conducted anywhere within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor 
 
 
issuing the subpoena. 
 
(c) The subpoena need not disclose the names of possible defendants. 
 
(d) Witness fees and expenses shall be paid as in a civil action. 
 
(5)(a) At the beginning of each compelled interrogation, the prosecutor shall personally inform 
each witness: 
 
(i) of the general subject matter of the investigation; 
 
(ii) of the privilege to, at any time during the proceeding, refuse to answer any question or 
produce any evidence of a communicative nature that may result in self-incrimination; 
 
(iii) that any information provided may be used against the witness in a subsequent criminal 
proceeding; and 
 
(iv) of the right to have counsel present. 
 
(b) If the prosecutor has substantial evidence that the subpoenaed witness has committed a 
crime that is under investigation, the prosecutor shall: 
 
(i) inform the witness in person before interrogation of that witness’s target status; and 
 
(ii) inform the witness of the nature of the charges under consideration against the witness. 
 
(6)(a)(i) The prosecutor may make written application to any district court showing a reasonable 
likelihood that publicly releasing information about the identity of a witness or the substance of 
the evidence resulting from a subpoena or interrogation would pose a threat of harm to a person 
or otherwise impede the investigation. 
 
(ii) Upon a finding of reasonable likelihood, the court may order the: 
 
(A) interrogation of a witness be held in secret; 
 
(B) occurrence of the interrogation and other subpoenaing of evidence, the identity of the 
person subpoenaed, and the substance of the evidence obtained be kept secret; and 
 
(C) record of testimony and other subpoenaed evidence be kept secret unless the court 
for good cause otherwise orders. 
 
(b) After application, the court may by order exclude from any investigative hearing or 
proceeding any persons except: 
 
(i) the attorneys representing the state and members of their staffs; 
 
 
(ii) persons who, in the judgment of the attorneys representing the state, are reasonably 
necessary to assist in the investigative process; 
 
(iii) the court reporter or operator of the electronic recording device; and 
 
(iv) the attorney for the witness. 
 
(c) This chapter does not prevent attorneys representing the state or members of their staff 
from disclosing information obtained pursuant to this chapter for the purpose of furthering 
any official governmental investigation. 
 
(d)(i) If a secrecy order has been granted by the court regarding the interrogation or disclosure 
of evidence by a witness under this subsection, and if the court finds a further restriction on 
the witness is appropriate, the court may order the witness not to disclose the substance of the 
witness’s testimony or evidence given by the witness to others. 
 
(ii) Any order to not disclose made under this subsection shall be served with the subpoena. 
 
(iii) In an appropriate circumstance the court may order that the witness not disclose the 
existence of the investigation to others. 
 
(iv) Any order under this Subsection (6)(d) must be based upon a finding by the court that 
one or more of the following risks exist: 
 
(A) disclosure by the witness would cause destruction of evidence; 
 
(B) disclosure by the witness would taint the evidence provided by other witnesses; 
 
(C) disclosure by the witness to a target of the investigation would result in flight or 
other conduct to avoid prosecution; 
 
(D) disclosure by the witness would damage a person’s reputation; or 
 
(E) disclosure by the witness would cause a threat of harm to any person. 
 
(e)(i) If the court imposes an order under Subsection (6)(d) authorizing an instruction to a 
witness not to disclose the substance of testimony or evidence provided and the prosecuting 
agency proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a witness has violated that order, the 
court may hold the witness in contempt. 
 
(ii) An order of secrecy imposed on a witness under this Subsection (6)(e) may not infringe 
on the attorney-client relationship between the witness and the witness’s attorney or on any 
other legally recognized privileged relationship. 
 
(7)(a)(i) The prosecutor may submit to any district court a separate written request that the 
 
 
application, statement of good cause, and the court’s order authorizing the investigation be kept 
secret. 
 
(ii) The request for secrecy is a public record under Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government 
Records Access and Management Act, but need not contain any information that would 
compromise any of the interest listed in Subsection (7)(c). 
 
(b) With the court’s permission, the prosecutor may submit to the court, in camera, any 
additional information to support the request for secrecy if necessary to avoid compromising 
the interests listed in Subsection (7)(c). 
 
(c) The court shall consider all information in the application and order authorizing the 
investigation and any information received in camera and shall order that all information be 
placed in the public file except information that, if disclosed, would pose: 
 
(i) a substantial risk of harm to a person’s safety; 
 
(ii) a clearly unwarranted invasion of or harm to a person’s reputation or privacy; or 
 
(iii) a serious impediment to the investigation. 
 
(d) Before granting an order keeping secret documents and other information received under 
this section, the court shall narrow the secrecy order as much as reasonably possible in order 
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